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ABSTRACT

PUBLIC POLICY AND THE BUSINESS LIFE CYCLE
by

Hugo Barreca

Advisor: John Mollenkopf

This study uses a business life cycle perspective to investigate and compare three different
approaches to urban economic development policy, each of which focuses on a particular stage of
company development. Well-meaning urban policies might be more effective if they were aligned
with all the common stages of the business life cycle. This study compares programs that address
specific stages of the business cycle to demonstrate that it is possible to address each stage. While
it is not possible with a small number of cases and many dimensions of variation to validate a
causal model of which packages of policies have what effects, it is possible to measure how well
each type of policy is achieving its desired ends.
Combining the individual perspectives into a unified whole will help entrepreneurs on their
entire journey and therefore encourage and strengthen regional competitiveness. The cases include
major Canadian cities that focus on early-stage capital formation, New York City, which focuses
on growing existing firms, and Barcelona, which takes the unusual approach of recycling firm
components when companies are on the point of failure or dissolution. The dissertation asks what
iv

theory motivates each of these economic programs, what factors these programs address, and
which they miss. It concludes by drawing lessons about how these policy perspectives could be
combined into a more comprehensive and resilient framework.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty-five years, nearly two dozen startup organizations in New York City’s
Silicon Alley have engaged me as CFO and/or legal counsel. The enterprises were both non-profit
and for-profit and included a wide range of products and services.
The first thing to do in any of my startup assignments was to ascertain where the company
was in its development arc. Companies go through a basic business life cycle, from birth to exit.
They share the same challenges in each stage of growth; they face the same risks as they transition
from one stage to the next. Startups in the early stages may have inexperienced leadership and
search for seed or Series A financing; they need coherent, defensible financial projections and
correct legal structure. Growth-stage companies must establish product viability and must grow the
right team, all while managing cash flow and controlling investor relations. Mature startups may be
at the end of the runway and need either product liftoff or substantial new capital injections; they
can be on the cusp of great success or great failure and founders waver between buoyancy and
despair.
When entrepreneurs start a company, they undertake a dangerous journey. They might have
chosen this path due to their zealous belief in a new idea, or for more practical reasons such as a
weak job market, but everything they do and everything they hope to achieve can be concentrated in
this moment. Their fortunes and reputations are at stake.
For many it is a novel experience. They seek advice, professional services, and financing
from personal networks that are idiosyncratic in their depth and extent. To those networks, these
entrepreneurs become highly visible, and the results of the enterprise may define their personal
standings in their community. Whether from naivete or from careful balancing of risks, some will
1

proceed, and society applauds these potential creators of wealth and jobs. As they grow the
company they will develop increasing fiduciary responsibilities to their investors, partners, and
staff. Yet within five years most will close down, and that is a lonely encounter.
As a business consultant with years of experience working with startups, receiving a sudden
cascade of emails from a dozen members of the same company asking to meet for coffee was
usually the harbinger of impending doom. Success at developing an idea, raising startup money,
building a team, filing a patent, designing a trademark, implementing financial and legal
accountability, securing suppliers, marketing, developing and selling a product can all be turned
into a “failure” if “success” is defined only by some wealth threshold. Entrepreneurs can face legal
liabilities, disgruntled investors, and disappointed staff who joined their fates to the founder’s. The
shame of failure can vary in different social environments, from knowledgeable acceptance in
Silicon Valley to condemnation in New York City, but in my experience, there is a lack of
resources to help guide the players through difficult times, or to help avoid collapse, or to help wind
things down neatly.
One result of the emotional difficulties in facing this outcome is the inability to rationally
ascertain the true salvage value of the company (or its components) and the value of its human
capital. The intellectual property and know-how might be worth reinvestment or transfer to another
enterprise. Specialized teams may have been developed that could be readily assumed by a new
company rather than to have the same team reassembled person by person elsewhere.
Teams that have invented laser-based spectrographic instruments, or three-dimensional
holographic projections, or other unique products,1 have been disbanded and scattered after a
company has folded. Their maximum current value as a team is wasted, only to be slowly
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Reflecting my experience with startup companies such as Human Condition Safety and Lambda Solutions.
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reconstructed in other companies later. The shock and disorder endemic to failure leaves short time
for rational decision making and is where mature advice could provide the most benefit.
For some potential entrepreneurs, the fear of failure and the uncertainties of
entrepreneurship are enough to keep them from ever starting. The Global Entrepreneurial
Monitoring Survey (2018) maps “fear of failure” to respondents in different countries. This fear
varies widely around the world, confirming that the stigma of failure is socially defined. Fear of
failure is very high in Japan but very low in Botswana. This variance is doubtless due to a blend of
economic opportunity and social pressure, but it is also indicative that it is subject to change under
varying conditions and can be influenced by policy. Wage-earners are fearful of leaving a steady
salary for the dangers and rewards of entrepreneurship if business failure is terminal to their careers.
Public sector officials can see the private sector as a kind of inscrutable fermentation
process from which companies emerge spontaneously. Their view of entrepreneurship is from the
outside in: how do we support this process with training and infrastructure? While those are good
questions, a perspective from the inside out, supporting enterprise not at just the touchpoints the
company periodically makes with government but throughout the company’s lifespan, would
augment traditional societal programs to strengthen company’s abilities to withstand predictable
challenges.
It may take courage to generate government support for companies who are in jeopardy
(“losers” – Donald Trump). It may also take courage to invest government dollars in a portfolio of
startup investments, even if they do so (indirectly) through tax incentives, because of the same risk
of criticism. But as this dissertation will demonstrate, support of businesses at different stages of the
business life cycle is not only possible but is being done successfully, in part, around the world.
Putting those pieces together for continuous support is possible right now.

3
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CHAPTER 1: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE CITY
The history of urban development is inextricably linked to the history of business
development. Historians often attribute city growth to unique place-based advantages, such as
locations along trading networks or near valuable natural resources. These geographic features
inspired the development of businesses, which attracted labor and, over time, fostered the
development of concentrated industry and specialized knowledge. When transportation systems
developed to include large international shipping, highways, and air travel—thereby lessening the
importance of a city’s particular location—cities still took advantage of being established
commercial hubs, but the “relative influence of historical factors was reduced” (Wolfe, 2011, 7).
A presumptive goal of every regional economy is to maintain its economic position as a joband-wealth creation engine and to compete with other regions for the same (Chatterji, Glaeser and
Kerr 2013). Today’s information economy is even freer from place-based factors, such as the local
resources or transportation systems that were important in the industrial period. This creates a more
globally competitive environment. As competition for money and talent escalate, regions seek to
create distinct advantages in local and global settings. Marshall (1890) and Krugman (1997) say
advantages accrue when cities attract like-minded enterprises to concentrate geographically and
share talent and tap into existing resources. Others say cities should foster industry diversity, which
breeds innovation and generates fertile ground for new ways to leverage existing ideas (Jacobs
1960).
Regardless of the approach, cities seek to promote entrepreneurship (defined as creating new
companies, expanding existing companies through growth and acquisitions, or revitalizing
moribund enterprises) to grow employment and create wealth. Urban governments employ
business-friendly policies to try to retain home-grown talent and attract new talent and investments
5

to remain competitive and relevant as the world evolves around them. Urban environments like
New York depend on their density and self-selected citizenry to cause fermentation in a startup
ecosystem (Florida 2013). Entrepreneurship is contagious. Once involved, players return (Global
Economics Monitoring Survey 2018)

Government Support for Entrepreneurship
A variety of factors can help or hamper entrepreneurship. Some are internal to the life of
firms, such whether people have good commercial ideas or innovations, whether they can find
sources of capital willing to invest in them, whether the labor pool is suitable, rents affordable,
etcetera. Some are external, such as whether universities and research institutes provide a
knowledge base, whether a concentration of skilled people live nearby, whether the labor pool is
educated, the legal structure consistently protects intellectual property, the local business culture
finds entrepreneurial risk and attendant failures to be socially acceptable, and so on.
Governments usually justify supporting and advising businesses as creating positive
externalities and compensating for various types of market failure. Some observers doubt that
government is wise enough to out-think the market (Buss 2001), but others point out that
government investment in technological research and development provided the basis for the
modern age (Mazzucato 2013). The debate among economists and policy makers features those
who think the government's efforts unnecessarily supplement an already efficient market system
(Buss 2001) and advocates who think the government can effectively support the market (Jenkins
2011).

6

While the optimal role of government in supporting business development remains a subject
of debate, it has become standard for urban administrations to demonstrate some level of support
for regional businesses. Urban governments tend to tailor local economic development policy to
support businesses at specific stages of the firm life cycle.
The firm life cycle

Individual businesses go through a life cycle, from birth to market exit. There are six stages in this
life cycle:
(1) conception of the business idea,
(2) forming a legal entity and assembling the core team,
(3) raising capital and expanding the team to go into operation,
(4) developing the product and rapidly increasing staff to scale up production,
(5) deploying the product in the marketplace and achieving market share, and
(6) equity outcome (profitable stabilization, IPO / acquisition, or dissolution).

Firms in each stage face similar problems, regardless of their product or market, and to
survive they must bridge operational and resource gaps that arise during transitions from one stage
to the next. So basic is this common development curve in business that one expects to find policy
geared to serve organizations as they evolve from one stage to the next, but policy formation based
on an integrated life-cycle approach is missing or primarily applied to one or two stages while other
stages are unrecognized. This dissertation proposes that such a framework is viable and would
provide coherence to existing methodologies. As noted by Charles Wolf (1987, 43):
. . .both markets and governments entail predictable and serious shortcomings.
Nevertheless, the corpus of modern economics treats these shortcomings asymmetrically:
whereas the shortcomings of markets have been exhaustively analyzed and formally
articulated in existing theory - namely, the theory of market failure - the treatment of
government shortcomings has usually been relegated to case studies, anecdotes, and
7

polemics. . .because we lack a comprehensive theory of government shortcomings (nonmarket failures) as a counterpart to the existing theory of market failure.

Entrepreneurship is on the decline
Despite the emphasis that urban and regional governments have placed on local
entrepreneurship, only 1.3% of the general population are involved in starting and managing new
companies (Global Entrepreneurship Monitoring survey).
SCREEN: YES, OWNS,
MANAGES A BUSINESS
NO
SCREEN: YES, JOB
INVOLVES BUSS STARTUP

YES

NO
1,531,414

226,105

38,381

23,890

1,569,795

249,995

YES

Total
1,757,519
62,271

Total

1,819,790

Yes, startup:

1.3%

Total pop

Figure 1 Global Startup Rate (Global Entrepreneurship Monitoring Survey)

Firm birth rate was trending down over the last few decades and was at replacement levels
up until 2019. Firm births have shot up post pandemic, according to some estimates, but “ as
research shows that firms born during recessions not only start smaller but also tend to stay smaller
in future years, even when the economy recovers.” (Djankov, Zhang 2021).
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Note from authors (Djankov, Zhang) of study: Pre-2018 data are retrieved from BDS (Business Data
Statistics, US Census). 2018-2020 data are estimates. Firm deaths and births correspond to the period
between April of the year shown on X-axis to March of the following year. This exercise is done to match the
BDS data timing. For example, 2018 data corresponds to firm births and deaths estimated for April 2018 to
March 2019. Data for 2020 (April 2020 –March 2021) are annualized with April – December 2020 data
Figure 2 Firm Birth and Death Rate (Djankov, Zhang)

Startup job creation in the United States has also been on the decline for decades. The
number of new firms per 1,000 individuals in the labor force fell from 5.6 to 2.6 over the past
thirty-five years. (Kauffman Foundation).
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Figure 3 Startup Job Creation per 1,000 People 1996-2019 (Fairlie, Desai)

Young firms create jobs, but total employment in small, young firms is in long-term decline.

Figure 4 Net Job Creation by Firm Size (Fairlie, Desai)
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Increasing and retaining human capital
In efforts to encourage entrepreneurship, urban public policy tends to focus on maintaining
“human capital” in a given location. The concept of human capital suggests that investments in
people—through skills and expertise—are what drive productivity and innovation (Rosen 1989).
There is little disagreement that concentrations of talented, educated, and entrepreneurial people
lead to economic success. Higher skilled employees earn more income and provide a bigger tax
base and tend to attract other similarly skilled workers (Moretti 2012). Although human capital is a
blend of skills that allow workers to engage in complex tasks, the usual measurement of degrees of
human capital is educational attainment; highly productive workers also benefit those who work
and live around them in the region. There are different strategies that urban governments use to
increase human capital. Wolman (2017) notes that these strategies differ in type and in
effectiveness; common examples are through education, workforce development programs, or
investments in infrastructure that provide jobs. To the latter point, many urban economic
development initiatives focus on stimulating entrepreneurship through bringing in investments
targeted at seeding new firms or growing early-stage ones. What many initiatives miss in trying to
increase and retain human capital is that it’s not only necessary to foster an ecosystem that
celebrates innovation—it is equally critical to provide an environment that expects and accepts
failure.

Planning for failure
It is not easy to start a company and get to the point where it is worthy of growth equity or
tax incentives to expand its employment. The share of employment in large mature companies
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continues to rise, which may reflect demand for talent in a robust economy or may be indicate that
potential entrepreneurs consider the costs of failure to be too high. (Figure 4)
Forbes Magazine estimates up to ninety percent of startup companies fail (usually defined
as insolvency within five years of founding) (Patel 2015). “Failure” itself is in many ways a social
construct (Halberstam 2011), and societal attitudes towards failure vary from region to region, from
great tolerance in Silicon Valley, where startup and closedown experience are marks of honor, to
condemnation on Wall Street, where “losers” are shunned. Recovering from failure is
psychologically difficult for entrepreneurs, particularly in cultures that condemn failure
(Agiakloglou, Boras and Massa 2008). In a social environment where “not failing” is better than
“succeeding,” fear leads to stagnation. The financial and social costs of failure can discourage
business owners and potential entrepreneurs. And grief after an enterprise fails can interfere with
learning from mistakes and contribute to a failure to benefit from failure. If potential entrepreneurs
perceive that failure costs are too high, a negative feedback loop sets in. If fewer people witness the
possibility of successful entrepreneurship, fewer will consider it a career option.
Policies often focus on promoting successes rather than helping resolve potential failures.
They want “more” startups that “succeed.” There is nothing wrong with trying to promote an
environment that fosters a startup culture. That is the usual policy objective. But policies that serve
to mitigate the risks of failure might better foster a successful ecosystem (Fairlie, 2011, Massa,
2008). In particular, recycling experienced business acumen and the hard lessons of failure back
into a regenerative economy would do more to strengthen urban regions than misplaced incentives
for otherwise questionable growth (Thornhill 2003). Urban policy that helps normalize rather than
stigmatize failure will help entrepreneurs and their employees recognize the learned wisdom that
comes from the private college of failure rather than use psychological strategies to deny
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involvement or deflect blame (Khelil 2015; Morgan 2016; Norback 2016). Experience pays, but
only if that experience is put back into the economy.
Failure is so common in business that one expects to find public programs across local and
regional contexts geared to support organizations as they face the pitfalls of transitioning from one
stage of the business life cycle to the next. However, most economic development policies focus on
the early or middle stages of the business life cycle by investing in new startups or scaling
companies. For example, a Canadian program administered by the Business Development Bank of
Canada makes equity investments in seed stage startups in major urban areas. New York City,
through the Economic Development Corporation, promotes growth and maintenance of existing
firms (and their tax and job base) primarily through tax incentives.
Barcelona’s Reempresa program is a rare example of a program focused on the late stages of
a company. The Barcelona Reempresa (“Restart”) program helps business owners sell their
companies as an alternative to closing and dissolving them. The program is modest in size
compared to New York’s EDC, but during the seven years for which Reempresa has provided data
(2011-2018), it brokered the transfer of 1,807 companies, an average of 258 per year (see Barcelona
section, below). The value of the businesses sold was 82.7 million euros and, by the program’s
calculation, 1,045 jobs were saved by having the businesses continue in operation under new
management. The Barcelona program has continued to be successful: over forty additional
Reempresa offices have opened in different cities in the Catalonia region. Ultimately, Reempresa is
an example of a program that accepts business failure as a common part of economic development
and is therefore able to maximize the economic benefits of entrepreneurship.
Even big companies fail. Compare the top ten global companies in 2008 and 2018. In 2008
only one company was based on information technology (Microsoft). In 2018, seven out of ten
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were. (Microsoft is the only company on both lists.) Planning for life cycle change is prudent and
rational for every sized organization.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Top Global companies 2008
PetroChina
Exxon
General Electric
China Mobile
ICBC
Gazprom
Microsoft
Royal Dutch Shell
Sinopec China
AT&T

Founded
1999
1870
1892
1997
1984
1989
1975
1907
2000
1885

$USbn
728
492
358
344
336
332
313
266
257
238

Top Global companies 2018
Founded
$USbn
1
Apple
1976
890
2
Google
1998
768
3
Microsoft
1975
680
4
Amazon
1994
592
5
Facebook
2004
545
6
Tencent
1998
526
7
Berkshire
1955
496
8
Alibaba
1999
488
9
J&J
1886
380
10 JP Morgan
1871
375
Source: Milford Assessment Management, from Startup Genome 2019
Figure 5 Top Companies 2008-2018 (Startup Genome 2019, 11)

Preemptive acquisition
Why would someone want to buy a business, especially if it were under distress? Because
given the right conditions, it is a smart business move. As Columbia University professor David
Stark said, “Build from the ruins, not on them” (2019). All sectors have barriers to entry into a
market, some more expensive than others. There is often considerable investment required in brand
establishment, marketing, legal work, raising capital, hiring and keeping trained staff, paying rent,
and buying equipment, among other factors. Existing businesses that have customer brand
14

recognition and a trained staff will have all those startup costs embedded in their price. That value
(referred to in accounting as “goodwill”) will be, of course, part of the acquisition price. A program
like Reempresa considerably lowers the cost required to identify businesses for sale, or conversely,
identify potential buyers. They also help reduce negotiation costs and act as a shopping forum to
compare various businesses for sale and to evaluate the strength of purchasers.
The owner of innovations can either try to commercialize or attempt to sell (or license) the
innovation. If commercialization is successful, the inventor may still be able to make more profit
from transfer of the innovation to an existing company, using the commercialization as proof of
concept. The acquiring company may be able to apply sales and marketing efforts at scale using
their existing networks; economies of scale may apply for hardware and administration costs and
take advantage of existing supply chain relationships at the command of the purchaser (Norback
2016). If a firm fails without the option to transfer ownership, the potential value of a good
innovation may remain untapped.
A program like Reempresa can also foster redeployment of the innovation and perhaps the
staff and entrepreneurs themselves in a new format. Some writers have doubted that re-entrants to
startups have a better chance of success. “Entrepreneurship, Economic Regeneration and Public
Policy” (Storey, Greene and Mole 2011) compares three decades of English startups in three
regions and points to a higher failure rate for entrepreneurs in their second and third attempts to
start companies in relatively low-tech arenas (20% of startups were automobile repair shops or
beauty salons). Other studies (Thornhill, Ivey and Amit 2003; Walsh 2017; Yamakawa 2013)
however point to higher success rates for startup veterans in the more complex technology sectors
where barriers to entry are higher and competition is more rarified.
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Regardless of how much human capital it is able to retain, the successful outcomes of the
Reempresa program suggest that, while investing in startups and mid-stage companies is effective
in meeting certain economic development goals, focusing on just the first half of the business life
cycle inadvertently misses opportunities to strengthen local and regional economies. Having public
policy strategies in place to reap benefits even from companies that fail—which, as noted above, are
the majority of companies—would be the best way to maximize aggregate employment and
earnings as well as encourage more people to start businesses. Effective public-private partnerships
at the city level can help businesses weather life cycle transitions effectively to manage the
possibility of failure and to encourage the creation of more businesses.
Urban economic development case studies in Canada, New York City, and Barcelona make
a case for incorporating plans for failure in economic develop strategies. Ultimately, cities should
take a more holistic, life-cycle approach to supporting businesses by providing support at critical
junctures across all life stages, and this requires that cities actively take failure into account.

16

CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND RESEARCH APPROACH
Regime theory and urban economic development policy regimes
Big agendas—such as fostering a business-friendly city—need big resources, which,
according to Stone (2005), are beyond the reach of individual private or public actors. Instead,
actors can come together to pool resources via a regime, or a set of arrangements bridging the
parallel tracks of political power and the power of free enterprise (Stoker 1995). “Public-private”
partnerships enable the support of businesses that may otherwise be too risky to support in the
private-only sphere. The government’s involvement distributes the risks and benefits more widely.
From a regime theory lens, large-scale urban economic development can only succeed when
a coalition of forces in both public and private realms combine efforts to achieve a goal. “Standing
alone, government is by itself an inadequate problem solver” (Stone, 309). There are different fields
of play, so competing actors bring competing agendas and may represent different constituents.
“Agenda setting, coalition building, resource mobilization, and devising schemes of cooperation are
central elements” (Stone, 309). Each of the actors, moreover, has varying strengths in different
arenas. An indispensable characteristic of a successful urban regime, according to Stone, is that it
can frame problems in such a way that many different groups and interests are engaged. A
successful regime must be able to identify a broad, engaging “purpose” and build realistic programs
to achieve this purpose. “Building and enlisting institutional partners.. [and to enlist allies who]
contribute significantly to a widely desired outcome” is a long-term process (Stone, 311-12). There
must be a fit between the broad purpose and the immediate goals if the regime is to remain strong.
A regime theory lens is used in the three case studies to investigate the patterns of
cooperation between public and private actors seeking to accelerate business growth in urban areas
beyond what might happen absent public intervention.
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To investigate how public-private partnerships can effectively create comprehensive life
cycle approaches to supporting business and economic development—specifically by taking the
strong likelihood of business failure into account—I look to three urban case studies that each use
such partnerships to successfully support businesses at particular stages:


Canadian cities focus on providing support to early-stage businesses by attracting capital.



New York City prioritizes firms in the growth stages by fostering ecosystem.



Barcelona helps companies on the brink of closure by resolving outcome.

At the heart of each program is the desire to retain and promote human capital in the cities in
question.
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Approach to case studies
In each case study public and private actors collaborate to support businesses. All three
urban economic development policy regimes are federalist in the sense that the public actors
(state/provincial/local governments) are autonomous and have a lot of room to maneuver. Canada
differs in that the ultimate source of local investments is a federal one, but the federal government
distributes funds through market-driven decisions made by professional investment bankers on a
local level. However, each case study is different in that it each uses public-private partnerships to
focus on a different part of the business life cycle.

Canada
A federal program in Canada—the Venture Capital Action Plan (VCAP)—invests in earlystage businesses in multiple cities by placing taxpayer investments through venture capital firms,
thereby allowing market forces to determine capital placement. The federal government developed
this program in response to a report (the Jenkins Report) commissioned in 2011 in response to a
perceived failure of Canadian startup firms to compete successfully for venture capital, especially
compared to firms in the United States (Jenkins 2011).
The Jenkins report drew a direct line from creation of startup companies to the economic
well-being of the entire nation. It therefore focused on startup creation as the fundamental missing
piece in the Canadian economy at the time, which, like many countries around the world, was
struggling to repair the damages done by the 2008 recession. VCAP, following exhaustive research
and recommendations, does not favor any one region, and guards against trying to promote any
special business sectors. This is partly due to the poor track record of politically driven government
support in the past. By using professional venture capital firms, the federal government places its
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investments where the market dictates. The program trusts the market more than government
planning.
The government’s investment in startup stock is a most direct form of public-private
partnership. The program, by de-risking investments for both the entrepreneur and the private
market, has succeeded, by its own measure, in attracting private capital three to four times greater
than their seed investments to Canadian entrepreneurs (BDC data). It has also allowed the Canadian
government to participate in potential equity upsides of the startup market as well as access a level
of startup data in private markets not usually available to a government agency.

New York City
Fifty years ago, people were abandoning New York. The city had spent more than it
collected in taxes and made up for it with debt. Its 1970 population of 7.9 million (a number that
had held steady since 1950) decreased to 7.1 million by 1980 (US Census). In the mid-70s the city
almost declared bankruptcy. Public services like subways and sanitation deteriorated, and white
flight left buildings abandoned. New York City’s faltering economy prompted the creation of the
New York City Public Development Corporation that sold or leased city-owned property. In 1979,
the city created the Economic Capital Corporation (later renamed the Financial Services
Corporation) to finance businesses and development with money raised through issuing tax-exempt
bonds. In 1991, these two programs merged into the Economic Development Corporation (EDC)
(Eldredge 2016). There are complex reasons for New York City’s reemergence from its low point,
including its position as a node in a complex of global cities (Sassen 2001, Taylor et al. 2005) and
from the coalitions formed by the Koch administration to right-size the city’s finances (Mollenkopf
1992). But the evolution of the EDC is rooted in policies to encourage business, keep jobs, and keep
the tax base.
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The EDC Website is full of encouragements to do business in New York City, and it
highlights special new projects such as the $100 million grant to the Cornell campus and a $30
million crypto-currency center, but its own data shows that the main targets of its generosity ($32
billion) are established companies and real estate, in keeping with its original mandate. The
investments made by the EDC are based on tax incentives that are valuable to tax-paying
companies, not to new ventures. New York’s tough Wall Street mentality does not seek to
acknowledge failures, and the EDC focuses on its original purpose of maintaining the city’s robust
existing economic engine. This ignores most startup firms that do not graduate into mature
businesses, whose good ideas and trained professionals must find other employment as best they
can.

Barcelona
Barcelona was also struggling in the 1970s. Like New York City, Barcelona has been a
major port for centuries, which contributes to its complex economic history. It was one of the first
Spanish cities to industrialize, and it grew bigger and richer in the 19th century, but the Spanish
Civil War of 1936-39 damaged Spain’s economy, and the dictator Franco’s plans for economic selfsufficiency resulted in Spain’s exclusion from the Marshall Plan. But by the 1950s, Spain received
loans from the US in exchange for military bases, and by 1955 the country joined the United
Nations and by 1958 the World Bank. Its new relations with the world economic community
prompted fifteen years of explosive growth called “the economic miracle.”
This growth collapsed in the 1970s, but with Franco’s death in 1975, Barcelona (and the
Catalonian region) regained its political autonomy and was able to develop programs for itself for
the first time in decades. Spain’s entry into the EU and the Barcelona-based 1992 Olympics were
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catalysts for new vitality in the region. The country put most of the Olympic development capital
into basic infrastructure like transportation and improvement of its airport, waterfront, and port
facilities rather than stadiums (Colantonio 2014, 120). A strategic plan created the idea of the
Barcelona Economic Triangle, a deliberate integration of Barcelona’s economy with the region of
Catalonia. The Government of Catalonia’s land development institute focused on the development
of knowledge-intensive industry clusters (Colantonio, 132). New land-use classifications have
attracted foreign investments: in Catalonia in 2018, over eight thousand foreign companies had
facilities or offices in Catalonia, with Germany, France and USA combining for half of that total.
(Barcelona-Catalonia.eu 2018).
The municipal development agency Barcelona Activa worked with the Consortium for the
Commercial Promotion of Catalonia (COPCA), the Catalan Agency of Competitiveness (ACCIO),
and the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce to come up with programs to support these
entrepreneurs. The “Reempresa” program is an extension of Activa, which offers free advice to
would-be startups. Most importantly, Reempresa focuses on keeping local businesses running rather
than closing. It is also a different type of entrepreneurial investment vehicle; investment in business
transfers can bring just as much money into an economy as investments in startups.

23

Context of cities under study
To get a sense of where the cities in the case studies fit in the global context, see the chart
below published by Startup Genome (2019) with its forecast of the top thirty urban ecosystems in
the next thirty years. These cities are in the main sequence of global urban development.
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Figure 7 Next Top Thirty Entrepreneurial Cities (Startup Genome 2019, 12)
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Data
While it is not possible with a small number of cases and many dimensions of variation to
validate a causal model of which packages of policies have what effects, it is possible to measure
how well each type of policy is achieving its desired ends. Because the Canadian program aims to
fund startups, it was straightforward to analyze the data with that in mind. Just as straightforward,
the Barcelona program aims to rescue mature businesses from closure. The EDC doesn’t specify
life cycle as part of its mission, but the data reveal it makes the majority of its investments in midlife companies.

Canada
In response to requests made to the Business Development Bank of Canada, they provided
proprietary data on VCAP investments at the city and province level in “.csv format” derived from
the program’s database. This data is not publicly accessible. It includes details about each of its
317 investments between 2011 and 2018. This data is used to show how the program was meeting
its objectives by parsing individual investments and how they were made over time, by business
sector, by location, and by the stage of the company at the time of investment, plotted against
regional growth patterns and returns on investments.

New York City
New York’s EDC makes its data available in .csv format online. The data includes 473
transactions done by the EDC since the year 2000 and includes variables such as business sector,
start and end dates of incentives granted, and dollar amounts by NAICS codes and business types.
This analysis uses EDC’s 2019 transaction data to investigate how the EDC distributed incentives
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by industry type and by the timing of the grants, showing what kinds of business the EDC had
supported in the past twenty years and where those distributions were going over time.

Barcelona
The director of Barcelona’s Reempresa program supplied proprietary data in .csv format
after extensive negotiation. The board’s attorneys drafted a Memorandum of Understanding
governing use of the data for research purposes only. Reempresa redacted the names of the
companies and the individual buyers and sellers, although it retained the demographic data
associated with individuals. This data is used to investigate the success of the program and the
nature of the companies, the motives and abilities of would-be sellers and potential buyers, and to
investigate whether cradle-to-cradle support is a viable option for public policy.

Limitations of the analysis
The analysis focuses only on direct outcomes of public-private efforts to support business
development in cities and does not look at broader policies that shape the context, like
infrastructure, mass education, or specific workforce development approaches to upskilling labor.
Even within my focus, outcomes are hard to measure, because it is not possible to perform
economic experiments or evaluate what would have happened in a program’s absence. It is
difficult or impossible to isolate one variable in an economy that has almost infinite variables.

26

CHAPTER 3: CANADIAN CITIES
Canada’s urban economic development policy regime
Canada’s urban economic development policy regime takes the form of a partnership
between the federal government (through the Business Development Bank of Canada [BDC]), local
municipalities, and professional venture capital firms. Through this partnership, known as the
Venture Capital Action Plan (VCAP), the federal government effectively takes an equity stake in
promising, early-stage startups by distributing investments in different cities and regions. Their
stated goals: to attract capital to Canadian startup and growth companies, to participate in
companies’ futures through direct equity ownership in the companies supported, and to improve
Canadian productivity so that it is competitive with global markets by sponsoring research and
innovation.
The federal government distributes VCAP funds through the Minister of Small Business,
Export Promotion and International Trade, with guidance from the Department of Innovation,
Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED); investments flow through the BDC, which in
turn invests in startups via four different venture capital firms: Teralys Capital, Northleaf Venture
Catalyst Fund, Kensington Venture Fund, and HarbourVest Canada Growth Fund.
The investments made by these funds must conform to government parameters that ensure
investments are going into Canadian-based companies founded or managed by Canadian
entrepreneurs. However, the program uses market criteria to determine which firms to invest in. For
example, the Teralys Capital Fund invests, according to their website
(https://www.teralyscapital.com/en/), sector allocation (55% IT, 35% life sciences, and 10% clean
tech) and stage allocation (65% seed and startup, 35% growth and expansion). By placing taxpayer
investments through venture capital firms, the government allows market forces to determine
27

capital placement. This section asks whether the program has met its goal of supporting mostly
startup and early-stage companies.
The motivation behind VCAP was a report written by a group sponsored by the Canadian
Federal Government (the “Independent Panel on Federal Support to Research and Development”).
The Panel was chaired by Thomas Jenkins, Chair of the National Research Council of Canada.
Entitled Innovation Canada: A Call to Action – Expert Panel Report of Federal Support to
research and Development (2010), the group raised concerns about Canada’s lackluster
productivity and its failure to recover from the 2008 recession. It is an ambitious report and has six
different recommendations; three that are more like “mandates” for greater discipline and
restructured priorities for the Canadian government, and three related to public policy programs for
transferring resources from tax credits to direct investment (Sulzenko 2016).
The report opens with an invocation that innovation is the ultimate source of long-term
competitiveness and quality of life, and that Canadian innovation has been lagging behind that of
other countries, particularly the United States.
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Level Of GDP Per Capita, Canada and the United States, (PPP $USD 2015), 1970 to 2019

Source: OECD, “Level of GDP per capita and productivity,” from Sean Speer, Drew Fagan and Luka Glozic, A
Post-Pandemic Growth Strategy For Canada, U of Toronto Working Paper, 2021.
Figure 8 Level of GDP per Capita, Canada and the United States, 1970 to 2019

Canadian entrepreneurs failed to achieve a rebound in venture capital funding after the crash
of 2008 (notes from interview with Director Neal Hill in July 2019). New businesses were not
contributing to the country’s GDP as they were before the downturn. The report’s mandate was to
“optimize contributions of the government of Canada to innovation and related business
opportunities” (Jenkins at al. 2010, E-3). The report involved 228 interview responses from
businesses, academics, and civic organizations, coupled with statistical analysis of over a thousand
R&D-performing companies (Jenkins, 1-5). Interviews conducted during the study suggested that
programs needed to be more visible and more focused on helping small-to-medium enterprises
(SMEs) to grow. People called for a “whole of government approach,” not a patchwork quilt of tax
incentives or job training programs that varied from province to province or city to city (Jenkins at
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al. 2010, E-4). The report noted that, among other factors, the government needed to consider
whether its public policies related to intellectual property protection, taxation, and bankruptcy were
favorable to innovation. Finally, the report suggested the federal government create a venture
capital investment program that would supply seed, early-stage, and growth funding and bolster the
relatively weak Canadian venture capital community. The specific recommendations that came out
of the report (Jenkins et al., 2010, E-9) were:

1. Create a whole-of-government program delivery vehicle, to be named the “Industrial
Research and Innovation Council.” This would provide a national “concierge service” to
help firms locate the help they need within the plethora of national and provincial
programs. The council would also work to develop an “innovation talent strategy” to
strengthen human capacity and productivity;
2. Give scientific research and experimental development tax credits, but unlike the
existing program, which is based primarily on cost of materials and cost of capital
equipment, issue tax credits based on labor-related costs;
3. Use public sector procurement to create demand. “Demand-driven” growth matches
market theory. Use this growth in new companies to connect to global supply chains;
4. Build public-private research and development institutions;
5. Provide risk capital; and
6. Provide “whole of government leadership.”

While Canada did not develop an Industrial Research and Innovation Council, it did take these
recommendations to heart by developing VCAP in 2013. The program also followed another
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investment strategy mentioned in the Jenkins Report: do not follow a sector-specific investment
strategy but support sector growth when appropriate. In other words: do not identify sectors in
advance that are politically desirable to a particular area, but instead make investment decisions
based on merit. That does not preclude supporting one sector if world-class investment decisions
are behind the decision to invest. By placing the investment decisions in the hands of outsourced,
private professionals, backed by government agency analysis and blessings, the public-private
program could free itself from allegations of bias. For example, energy-rich Alberta did not
automatically get government investment in energy programs that merely provide subsidies to
favorite companies for political support.
It is noteworthy that the Jenkins report mentioned the importance of “bankruptcy policies,”
but none of the report’s actual recommendations included this crucial phase. Instead, the entire
focus was on seeding and growing promising companies.

Program outcomes
The Research and Analysis Directorate of the Canadian Innovation, Science and Economic
Development Branch, which is the organization that advises the Business Development Bank of
Canada on investments, provided to the Jenkins panel data of small-to-medium business growth
taking into consideration standard characteristics of company makeup, including age of the
company, import vs. exports, amounts spent on research and development, as well as characteristics
of the owners or founders, to see what combinations of determinants perform best. Using “quantile
regression techniques to look for asymmetries between rapidly growing and rapidly shrinking
firms,” their conclusions fall into several main categories for firms on the way up or on the way
down.
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Despite the program’s purported interest in supporting primarily early-stage companies, in
certain sectors—Environment/Clean Technologies and Internet/Computer—growing and mature
companies commanded more investment and sponsored more jobs than early stage or seed startups
(See Appendix A). However, there was still considerable early-stage investment in these sectors
throughout the country. It’s possible that the particularities of these early-stage businesses do not
require massive amounts of funding to enter the marketplace. The government invested more evenly
across early and late-stage companies in the Life Sciences sector (See Appendix A), possibly because,
in Life Sciences, even preliminary products (e.g., vaccines) may need large seed capital to prove
safety and efficacy.
Data analyzed by city, rather than by sector, shows that the government funded a large
number of seed and early-stage companies with smaller investments, an approach that fits into
conventional investment portfolio strategies and allows ideas and products to germinate; those that
survive need expansion capital to bring their products into a larger market. For this reason, the
total amount of funding awarded to these seed and early-stage companies is less significant than
the number of companies funded. By this measure, the government program is meeting its goal of
prioritizing companies at an earlier life stage.
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Montreal
For example, in Montreal, forty-four seed companies commanded a little under $1 million
each; investments of about $2.8 million were made in each off twenty-three early-stage companies;
sixteen growth-stage companies averaged $17 million each, with the same amount going to only
six “late venture” enterprises. Note that a total investment of $487 million yields a “fair value”
portfolio of only $565 million at this stage of enterprise development, generating combined sales
of $555 million. Over five thousand jobs are associated with these companies, which would bring
economic spillover effects as well as tax revenue to the whole government, although not to BDC
directly.

Montreal Investments by Stage
$300,000,000

16

$250,000,000
$200,000,000
$150,000,000
$100,000,000

6
44 companies

23

$50,000,000
$0
Seed

Early Stage

Growth Equity

Figure 9 Montreal Investments by Stage - Number of Companies (BDC data set)
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Figure 10 Montreal Investments - Dollar amounts by stage (BDC data set)

Toronto
Toronto attracts more—and larger—investments, but the distribution of the VCAP funds
by business life cycle stage is similar. In Toronto, seed investments averaged about $1.5 million
compared to the $1 million limit in Montreal, and investments were made in sixty startup
companies, the most of any category. VCAP invested about $4.6 million on average to thirty-seven
early-stage companies, compared to $2.8 million each in Montreal; sixteen growth-stage
companies averaged $21 million each compared to Montreal’s $17 million each; but with much
less going to the five “late venture” enterprises.
The distribution of investments in each of these cities has a consistent pattern but that is
reflective of the investment market as seen by the VC firms handling the investments. Note that a
total investment of $648 million yields a “fair value” portfolio of a modest increase to $725
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million at this stage of enterprise development but generated combined sales of almost $1.5 billion.
Over seven thousand jobs are associated with these companies.
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Figure 11 Toronto Investments - number of companies (BDC data set)
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Figure 12 Toronto Investments by dollar amount (BDC data set)
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Vancouver
Vancouver is a smaller city but its funding distribution across newer and later-stage firms is
similar to Montreal and Toronto: smaller dollar amounts invested in many more startup and seed
stage firms, with bigger investments going to first past the seed stage. However, unlike in the other
two cities, all stages of investment in Vancouver lost value except for the “growth equity” stage.
Late venture investments, which took the biggest bets, lost 80% of their value. Growth equity did
better and doubled in value. These point to the political difficulty of trying to invest taxpayer
dollars and live with the potential for heavy devaluation. While the Canadian program is focused
on attracting capital, it does not make it immune to second guessing when investment returns are
disappointing.
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Figure 13 Vancouver Investments - number of companies (BDC data set)
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Figure 14 Vancouver Investments by dollar amounts (BDC data set)

Calgary
Calgary does not follow the pattern of the other cities; the majority of firms receiving VCAP
investments were in the growth stage; the city lacks the plethora of seed company investments
found in other cities. What accounts for this? Calgary is in the center of the new oil and energy
production province of Alberta; it is possible that there is an accumulation of talent in this sector
that self-reinforces startups that specialize in mitigating the effects of the oil production generated
in the province, and that the talent pool would be well-equipped to sponsor new developments in
that area. Calgary is home to 118 of the nation’s largest companies, many acting as first customers
to startups and partners in technology development.
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Conclusion
Canada’s urban economic development policy regime, VCAP, proclaims success in drawing
capital into Canadian cities in response to emergency conditions of decreasing capital investment.
Canada saw its earlier failures to invest as an existential threat to long-term Canadian economic
well-being. That realization was the result of systematic self-examination and thoughtful and
comprehensive plans for action.
As seen in the chart below, total VC investments in Canada quadrupled after the program
began, from $1.5 billion in 2011 to $6.2 billion in 2019, of which the government funds amounted
to one third. Some criticisms say that is too small, “a drop in an empty pond” (Cumming, Johan,
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MacIntosh, 2, 2016). They decry the “shortfall of venture capital in Canada relative to comparable
regions in the United States, despite massive government spending on governmental venture
capital programs in Canada. The Government of Canada committed $500 million towards venture
capital through the Venture Capital Action Plan. … We present data that shows Ontario’s
expenditures would have to be higher by $4.4 billion per year to achieve levels of VC/GDP that
are comparable to Massachusetts.” (Cumming, Johan, MacIntosh, 2)
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Source: Canadian Venture Capital Organization, compiled by Business Development Bank
Figure 16 Canada total venture capital investment, 2011-16 (CVCA)

The same critics may say that a good business venture would receive investment capital
with or without government support. The original Jenkins report proposed that by creating a long39

term attractor for capital within its own borders the program would maintain a competitive edge in a
global marketplace and to close the “productivity gap” vs. the United States. By that measure
success is limited. The productivity gap still exists (Figure 8).
The goal of the public-private partnership through VCAP was to provide increased equity
investments to Canadian entrepreneurs and to fund more seed and early-stage startups than
companies at other stages. By these measures, the program has been successful. The data show a
modest return on investment if the supplied “company valuations” are an accurate guide. The full
result of profitability and return on capital will only be known in future years as firms exit the
startup phase and either fail or have a liquidation event. Meanwhile, VCAP has put itself in equal
position with private investors and takes the same risk that most of the seeded companies will fail.
The program has put the majority of its efforts into starting new companies, despite evidence that
most companies never make it past early stage, because the Jenkins report showed that Canadian
productivity needed to be bolstered by new innovation regardless of any one company’s economic
outcome. The next chapter shows that New York City’s Economic Development Corporation uses
its urban economic development policy regime to help companies grow, supporting them as they
advance along the business life cycle but still falling short of planning for inevitable failures.
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CHAPTER 4: NEW YORK CITY
New York City’s urban economic development policy regime
New York City, with a GDP of $635 billion for the city proper (BEA 2021) and closer to
$1.8 trillion for the NY-NJ-CT-PA corridor (Statista 2021), has an economy bigger than Russia’s
and equal to that of Italy (World Bank 2021). New York City officials see startup companies as the
drivers of economic growth and wealth creation, and their success attracts likely entrepreneurs who
come seeking their educations or their fortunes (Florida 2013). Historically, New York City was a
strategic location for shipping as the gateway to the New World, but the city has evolved to the
“trade” category, in which many sectors provide services to the world in areas such as finance,
education, and intellectual property. Traded industries are not resource dependent and sell products
and services across all regions as well as globally (Porter 2003). New York has a deep economic
history with many established sectors. Several forces—automation, systems of distribution,
immigrant labor, and zoning—combined and created a momentum in New York that carried light
industry forward for a hundred years (Gurwitz 2019).
Those sustaining forces dissipated in the 1960s and 70s, a period in which the city
population declined from eight to seven million and in which it almost declared bankruptcy. The
city had accumulated $6 billion in short-term debt, and creditors refused to lend more. Governor
Hugh Carey helped bring in a financier from investment firm Lazard Frères, Felix Rohatyn, who
took the (volunteer) lead role in forming an entity called the Municipal Assistance Corp. (MAC),
which included other business leaders (and no politicians). The MAC put together an alliance with
banks, municipal unions, and city and state governments to refinance the $6 billion in short-term
debt into $8.5 billion in long-term loans and debt deferments. Rohatyn also persuaded municipal
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union to purchase MAC bonds and cut their staff (Neelan 2019). When New York began to regain
fiscal stability, it wanted to help firms survive and prevail. Founded in the Koch administration, the
NYC Economic Development Corporation (EDC) was the key vehicle for helping businesses
survive and thrive, with an inevitable focus on real estate development.
One of the EDC’s main purposes is to make public investments in public infrastructure and
services that will induce private investments that “but for” the public investment might not have
been possible. The EDC uses an array of standard financial tools for these investments: tax
incentives, underwriting bond payments, and, in some instances, providing direct payment to
developers and investors to bridge the gap to revenue generation. 2
Tax increment financing is seductive because it implies that by correctly assessing future tax
revenues and using them as leverage to gain immediate private investment dollars, a given
development project will finance itself in the long run. “Tax increment financing (TIF) originated in
the 1950s as an urban renewal strategy and has developed into one of the country’s most used
economic development tools. Today nearly every state authorizes some form of TIF, which is used
to fund hundreds of projects each year” (Citizen’s Budget Committee 2017). It will also generate
construction and supply chain employment and be home to new enterprises with many potential
spillover effects. It will work as anticipated only if the project generates the expected tax revenue.
That could include sales tax, property tax, income tax on jobs created or housed. The EDC uses
input-output analysis to help justify investments. If the government agency that employs TIFs must
make up for revenue shortfall with payments out of the city budget, it may be subject to criticisms

2

I was CFO of an international infrastructure finance company, where I constructed dozens of deals and proposal using
these financial instruments. These included: construction of university campus buildings, professional sports arenas,
recycling systems, hospitals, energy infrastructure, road and highway systems, and public transportation systems, from
Arizona to Nigeria to the Philippines. These instruments are not esoteric or particularly innovative, but they do work as
an organizing principle to bring together the disparate energies in public-private financing.
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and claims of waste of taxpayer money to support boondoggle private deals (Fisher and Leite
2018), but one might say that this is a known risk that is necessarily part of the public-private deal
package. Without the government agency guaranteeing the payments to bond holders, the price of
the bonds would be much more expensive and could put the project out of commercial reach.
Payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTS) work because they divert real estate taxes to a building
developer for a certain period to guarantee cash flow in exchange for capital outlays. It is a way to pay the

developer back and provide a return on investment without having to pull directly from the city’s
operating budget. Almost half of New York City’s budget comes from real estate taxes (Citizen’s
Budget Committee 2017). Building owners are going to pay real estate taxes anyway; PILOTs
usually result in a discount, making them even more attractive.

Program outcomes
The stated goals of the EDC are to encourage new company formation and to attract new
regional offices of established companies; Facebook and Google are recent examples of companies
with new footprints in the city.
To determine how much support to provide a company, the EDC estimates a subject
company's annual business output for each year by dividing the number of its full-time employees
by the “relevant RIMS factor representing the typical number of jobs per million dollars of output
for that sector” (EDC 2019 report to the Mayor’s Office). It then goes further by estimating
“indirect” inputs and outputs of the ripple-effects of the primary effects, such as support services
demanded by the subject company. The model converts these figures into current dollars for each
fiscal year using historical and projected inflation factors. For years after 2019, the EDC assumes
output will grow at 3.5% annually (EDC Financial Statements,
Required Supplementary Information Years Ended June 30, 2018 and 2017).
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The EDC uses total outputs—the economic benefits to be generated by the introduction of
the subject entity into the regional economy—to justify the various kinds of support it grants to the
companies being modeled.
The EDC publishes a full account of its investments each year, including the start date of
each project. From a full lifespan impact perspective, the full calculation by the EDC of their
overall support (both spent and pledged) in for all projects active in 2019 was $35 billion,
accounting for all support given in the past plus future amounts pledged to the existing projects
(EDC data tables 2019).
It is helpful to look at the details of just one year (2019) as an example of how that number
is derived over the lifetime of all projects. Direct discretionary financial assistance from the EDC
totaled $121 million across 469 new and ongoing investment projects in 2019. However, a better
gauge of EDC assistance must account for the value of that assistance over the life of the project (an
average of 35 years). It is axiomatic in the business world to match an asset’s expected life span
with a calculation of cost over that lifespan (that is the basis of “depreciation”). But it is equally
correct to say that the EDC provided $121 million in support in 2019 and that it pledged $4.5
billion in support in 2019. The pledge includes future support.
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Total Assistance Given by Borough for Projects Begun in 2019 ($ millions)

Report of the Finance Division for the EDC (March 2020) (Ali 2020)
Borough

Total
Projects

Bronx

Total
Borough
Total
Assistance
Projects
Provided in
FY19
6
$20.6
Bronx
72

Brooklyn

5

10.8

Brooklyn

129

579.1

Manhattan

9

38.8

Manhattan

114

2,872.9

Queens

3

48.8

Queens

124

458.8

Staten Island

2

2.8

Staten Island

24

81.9

25

$121.9

Total

469

$4,254.2

Total

Total Assistance
Over Project
Lifetime
$261.6

Totals may not sum due to rounding. Total aid in these tables reflects aid already granted plus the present value of future
aid that is already committed.

Figure 17 EDC assistance by borough 2019 (Ali, 2020))

Of the 469 active EDC projects in 2019, 186 were non-profits and 25 were new. The total
sum of aid is a very small portion—about two percent—of the total sum the city grants in economic
development tax breaks each year, which totaled $3.3 billion in Fiscal 2019 by DOF estimates
(Department of Finance, Annual Report on Tax Expenditures, Fiscal 2019). However, “it is
noteworthy not only because it is the only discretionary aid the city offers to private, for-profit
entities, but also because it comes with other indirect or non-financial forms of aid. Additionally,
projects receive aid for an average of 25 years, and each one may entail a lasting financial
commitment…. Because aid is often granted for long periods of time, the annual assistance granted
by the NYCEDC is mostly accrued to projects that started years or decades ago. The NYCEDC
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reports on past aid received, aid received in the current fiscal year, and future lifetime aid,
discounted at 7.75 percent.” (Ali 2020)
The following graph shows the distribution of EDC programs by numbers of projects by
start date—the date on which EDC executed the transaction and made the financial assistance
available. Seventy percent of the incentives EDC gives today are for projects that started before
2016. Since most of the company assistance comes in the form of long-term incentives to
established companies, the chart reflects the value of the support given cumulatively over the last
three decades.

# Current EDC Projects by Start Date:
2019 report
80

Most of the projects are long established

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Figure 18 EDC projects by start date (EDC data set)
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The following chart shows the investment dollar amounts by start date. Dollar amounts are
composed of various instruments, primarily forgiveness of tax, or use of the state as a guarantor for
the sale of bonds.

EDC distributions - $ per Start Date
(millions)

$7,000

$6,000

$5,716

$25B of $35B for companies started before 2016
$5,000
$4,298

$4,344 $4,268

$4,000
$3,310
$3,108

$3,000

$2,000
$3,283
$1,534
$924

$1,000

$861

$853

$543

$178

$583
$73

$0

$837

$160

$166 $6 $155 $74

Figure 19 EDC $ distributions by start date (EDC data set)

Finally, EDC invested most heavily in real estate development, largely due to its support of
the recent development in Hudson Yards; five of the seven companies that accounted for almost

47

half of all EDC support in 2019 were associated with the Hudson Yards development. The second
largest category after real estate was Information. In both of these industries, EDC prioritized
existing and well-established organizations.

Half of total support to top seven recipients
$4,000,000,000.00

$3,500,000,000.00

$3,000,000,000.00

$2,500,000,000.00

$2,000,000,000.00

$1,500,000,000.00

$1,000,000,000.00

$500,000,000.00

$50 HYMC
Owner LLC

509 W 34,
L.L.C.

Hudson
BOP NE
ERY Retail
Yards
Tower
Podium LLC
North
Lessee LLC
Tower
Tenant LLC

Figure 20 EDC top recipients (EDC data set)
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Yankee
Stadium
LLC

NBC
Universal,
Inc.

Almost one half of combined EDC resources to Hudson Yards
50 HYMC Owner LLC

$

3,835,000,000

509 W 34, L.L.C.

$

3,735,000,000

Hudson Yards North Tower Tenant LLC

$

2,674,000,000

One Hudson Yards Owner LLC

$

1,434,114,02

Legacy Yards Tenant LLC

$

1,386,000,000

BOP NE Tower Lessee LLC

$

2,180,000,000

$

15,244,114,029

Figure 21 Hudson Yards-related companies (EDC data set)

It is not obvious in the data set supplied by the EDC that the above companies are associated
with Hudson Yards. The data are not incorrect but you must search for corporate information about
each company separately to put the pieces together.
When seen in a Pareto distribution, it becomes apparent that the bulk of EDC support has
been distributed in large amounts to big projects and large companies.
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Figure 22 Pareto Chart – Top 20 EDC Projects (EDC data set)

50

$18,000,000,000

EDS support by NAICS Code

$16,000,000,000
$14,000,000,000
$12,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$-

Figure 23 Distribution of EDC support by NAICS code (EDC data set)

After Real Estate the second largest category of support is the “Information Sector,” which
seems an encouraging sign that newer companies are being supported. On looking deeper, that
information sector consists primarily of decades-old publishing companies and well-established
television and media enterprises.
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NBC Universal, Inc.

$ 1,500,300,000

Hearst Corporation, The

$

779,600,000

McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

$

700,000,000

New York Times Company, The

$

538,416,000

CBS Inc.

$

401,322,000

New York Post

$

168,915,000

Home Box Office

$

99,000,000

Cooke School and Institute

$

44,000,000

Technical Library Service, Inc.

$

4,875,000

Eastern Effects, Inc.

$

3,550,000

$ 4,239,978,000
Figure 24 EDC Information sector- EDC support detail (EDC data set)
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New York City’s interest in existing firms
The EDC focuses on supporting existing firms because it sees office-oriented employment
as a key element of retaining human capital. A report issued in the early 2000s by the “Group of
35” (Schumer et al. 2001, details below) forecast the loss of middle-class office jobs to New Jersey.
According to the report, New York City faced important problems in providing attractive office
space for its increasingly office-oriented work force. Private developers faced economic
disincentives when considering building new office space in New York City; among these were
high labor costs and the particular difficulty of agglomerating enough contiguous property on which
to construct substantial new office buildings. The loss of workers to New Jersey was not only a
local and immediate problem (eroding tax base) but also did not bode well for New York
maintaining its position in the cosmopolitan network of globally important cities (Schumer et al.
2001).
The organizing principal of human capital highlights the value of human potential, knowhow, and abilities to economic output. Geographical proximity promotes knowledge spillovers that
benefit knowledge production—positive externalities in the form of ideas that are “taken up by
others and combined with suggestions of their own and thus become the source of new ideas”
(Marshall 1890, 332). If New York lost its human capital to other areas in the region or to other
great attractors like Silicon Valley, a diminishing set of returns could mean a death spiral.
If an urban economic development policy regime needs a “purpose” to engage its various
elements of public and private resources, the actors settled on one—developing saturated office
space—at the turn of the latest century. U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer formed the Group of 35
Task Force in the early 2000s to address the growing shortage of commercial office space in New
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York City (Paprin 2000). The group determined that an un-orchestrated private sector alone could
not create the transformational development needed, because numerous potential development sites
were not zoned for office work and market rents were not high enough to cover development costs,
among other issues. As a remedy, the group proposed three new and expanded “Central Business
Districts”: Downtown Brooklyn, Long Island City, and the Far West Side.
Specifically, the group called for using these districts to attract and make room for
biotechnology and information technology sectors, thought to have tremendous potential to create
new high-skill, high-wage jobs for New York City. To do this, new office space would need to
come with tax incentives, improved telecom services, new zoning, lines of credit for companies’
equipment purchases, tax incentives, and reducing the credit risk for building developers (Schumer
et al. 2001).
The shared public-private goal to create more office jobs in New York City speaks to why
the city, and the EDC specifically, prioritizes investing in existing firms that are more likely to
generate this type of job growth. Rather than attracting startups, expensive office space attracts
established firms and provides jobs, generating income and property tax for the city. This focus on
growth also overshadows any potential interest in supporting firms in the later stages of business
development.

Limited startup support
While the EDC focuses its largest investments on existing firms, the organization does
support startups and early-stage companies through certain programs. The opening of the new
business accelerator “Civic Hall” in the Union Square district, devoted to increasing skill sets and
entrepreneurship, may be a new chapter in the startup environment.
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The EDC launched a project called BigApps in 2009 that invited New Yorkers to create tech
products that use public and private data to address pressing challenges facing the city. It makes
available various city-generated data sets and asks companies for proposals to use the data to help
improve city life. Winners got access to data and modest funding ($10,000 - $25,000) in an
unreported combination of cash and in-kind support (HR&A 2015). NYC opens its data sets to
analysts and ask them to identify risks and opportunities. It has now turned its original intention
from manipulation of data sets to blockchain software proposals to “seed potential pilots for NYC
government.” (https://edc.nyc/program/ blockchain-initiative).
The EDC also recently doubled its investment in the LifeSci NYC initiative, a 10-year
program meant to establish the city as a public health destination, earmarking $1 billion for future
investments: “$450M to spur new research, $430M for lab and incubator space construction, $20M
to build a diverse pipeline of life sciences talent in NYC.” (EDC https://edc.nyc/program/lifescinyc). As part of LifeSci NYC, the city is “seeking to support a critical mass of commercial entities
likely to attract significant capital and achieve long-term job growth in NYC… to life sciences
companies interested in expanding their operations in one of the City’s five boroughs.” (EDC Feb
2021) This fits with the approach described in the previous sections, where the EDC sponsors
expansion of existing businesses, and in many cases with help in providing facilities through tax
programs.
It may be that changes in direction of more recent or near-future support may be moving to
different sectors. Note almost half goes to real estate (“space construction”). In addition, the EDC
announcement of the program (cited above) specifies that research and development money will go
to “existing researchers and institutions,” not independent life sciences companies.
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Even if new sectors are funded the long tail of trailing distribution grants already promised
to existing grantees will overwhelm any new investments, even in the hundreds of millions of
dollars. The intention of putting half of the life sciences investments in real estate infrastructure
only reinforces past practices.
In 2019 EDC announced a good example of that: intentions to invest $38 million in biotech
centers at four applied research and development facilities at Columbia University, MontefioreEinstein, the New York Stem Cell Foundation, and Rockefeller University. The $38 million are in
the form of “infrastructure grants” that are not explained by the EDC but must be “grants” of some
kind.
The development of Cornell Tech is another example of NYC-led entrepreneurial
development. According to Cornell Tech Hub director Michael Samuelian, “The EDC and NYC
have only two things they can offer, land and taxes, not much else. They gave us some land and
$100 million and told us to go with God,” (interview with author, 2021). This is seed money
compared to projected initial costs of over $2 billion (Crains 2011).
City led programs do not always work as advertised. One example announced by Mayor de
Blasio, the “AI Task Force,” was chartered with the idea of creating a unified approach to use of
data generated by New York City agencies to provide “smarter” services and produce jobs. It faced
ridicule a year after its formation for never reaching agreement on fundamental definitions of the
systems it was promoting and had not created a single job. Jeff Thamkittikasem, director of the
Mayor’s Office of Operations, testified that the group had not reached consensus about what
constitutes an automated decision system, despite meeting about 20 times in a year. “My major
concern is that the task force has been on a trajectory of nothing. A lot of time has been wasted,”
said Rashida Richardson, a task force member from NYU (Budds 2019). “A Kafkaesque
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nightmare,” said one participant, citing the City’s unwillingness to share information about the
decision-making systems it was already using, and the information it did provide “felt more like
pitches or endorsements” (Cahn 2019). This example highlights that seeding innovation has not
been the strong suit of the New York City urban economic development policy regime, and that the
city seems to feel safest promoting growth of existing initiatives.

Does NYC need to attract more capital and startups?
New York City and the surrounding region have robust economies and do contain a lot of
startups and attract venture capital. Are normal market conditions sufficient to drive
entrepreneurship? There is room for improvement.
Billions of Dollars of Venture Capital Invested in US Regions in 2018-19:

Los Angeles-Long
Beach, CA

San Jose-San
Francisco-Oakland,
CA

Others

1.5

9.3

8.9

2.4

12.0

8.3

2.3

13.0

5.0

1.6

12.0

2.4

2.0

26.0

New York-Newark,
NY-NJ-CT-PA

Quarter

Q4 2019

3.0

Q3 2019

4.9

Q2 2019

4.3

Q1 2019
Q4 2018

$

19.6

$

9.8

Source: 2019 NYC Quarterly Economic Update, NYC Controller’s Office
Figure 25 U.S. Regional Venture Capital 2019 (Stringer)
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$

72.3

9.9
7.8
9.8

$

44.7

Do Entrepreneurs Turn to NYC?
A recent survey in 2021 distributed to more than 100 startups within the Brooklyn Navy
Lab’s startup accelerator New Lab further drives this point. Of the sixteen new firms that
responded, none even considered New York City to be a source of assistance in starting up a
company.
Granted, the responses are biased because companies at New Lab usually already have
obtained financing, have at least generated proof of concept, a marketing plan, and a viable
management team. However, many of the responding firms were still seeking some financing.

New Lab survey

Which of the following best describes you? Select all that apply.
You are currently trying to start a new business and are seeking your first seed financing.
You are currently trying to start a business and have seed financing but are looking for Series A financing.
You are currently the full or part owner of a business you help manage that you started in the last three years.
You have, in the past three years, personally provided funds for a new business started by someone else.
You are, alone or with others, have ideas about a new business but are still organizing the first team.
In the past 12 months you shut down a business you owned. Do not count a business that was sold.
Fear of failure would prevent you from starting a new business.

6
6
6
2
0
1
1
1

Other

1

None
Figure 26 Survey Question: Self-identification
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Many of the firms sourced financing from friends, family, or individuals known to the
entrepreneur. The other funding comes from institutions.

Have you received or do you expect to receive money—loans or ownership investments--from
any of the following to start this business? Check all that apply.
Friends and family

8

Individual private investors

13

Work colleagues

2

An employer

1

Venture capital firms

5

Banks or other financial institutions

4

New York State programs

5

New York City programs

0

Federal programs

1

Other

2

Figure 27 Survey Question: Money source

When asked whether the firms received support from EDC in starting their business, nearly all
respondents said “no.” New Lab itself did receive EDC support for reconstruction of its power
plant.

Did you receive help (financial or management advice) from the New York City Economic
Development Corporation (EDC) when you started your business?
1
No

5

Yes - guidance

1

Yes – funding

1

Figure 28 Survey Question: EDC economic support
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A number of companies did receive tax or R&D credits from other local or state agencies.
Did you receive help other help from New York State or New York City agencies (i.e., SBA,
tax credits, business advice) when you started your business?
Yes - SBA

2

Yes - tax or R&D credits

5

Yes - guidance

1

Yes - other

1

No

9

Figure 29 Survey Question: other government support

Another question provides helpful context to understanding why firms do not go to public
agencies for help starting their businesses. Regardless of what kind of support was available,
entrepreneurs did not seem to see it as a worthy pursuit. Interestingly, all respondents gave reasons
for not interacting with a government agency, even though some had such interaction.
If you did not interact with any government agency or programs, why not?
Didn't think of it

2

Too complex - low return on time invested

6

Too little time to investigate procedures

2

Help not valuable in my circumstances

1

Didn't know where to look or that help was available

3

Law firm or accounting firm took care of details

2

Figure 30 Rationale for not seeking government support

The entrepreneurs who successfully made it into the New Lab family may have had sufficient other
resources that were more valuable than government help, or they found their initial interactions
with the city and state a poor return on investment to pursue thoroughly. In my personal experience
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in Silicon Valley (eight ventures), entrepreneurial social networks and venture capital firms were
usually at the top of the list of funding sources; government was often seen as a legal watchdog that
needed to be satisfied with financial reporting to avoid trouble and satisfy investors.
The final question addresses a question that is key to this dissertation: what support will
your business need if you face financial or other difficulty? Nearly all respondents—and more than
in any other category—said they would find advice on bankruptcy issues useful. A majority of
respondents also said they would appreciate programs to deal with refinance or sale of businesses.
Notably, New York City does not provide such programs as a central part of its economic
development agenda.
If your business experiences financial or other difficulty, which of the following
would you find useful? Choose all that apply.
Programs to deal with refinance or sale of business

9

Obtaining business advice or aid with financial planning

5

Advice on human resources, restructuring, other staff-related

9

Advice on dealing with investors

5

Advice on bankruptcy issues

13

Figure 31 Survey Question: What programs would you find useful

Conclusion
Though the small New Lab survey is far from representative, its results support the primary
assertion of this dissertation: that almost any company will likely eventually need support as it faces
failure and that any urban economic development policy regime should include late-stage support
as part of its agenda.
In an environment where any development is complex and costly, New York City’s EDC
thinks big and long-term, prioritizing smoothing the way for big projects. It uses control over land
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via zoning and grants to assemble partnerships that can create these big projects by leveraging
future tax revenues and the city’s credit rating to build infrastructure that private enterprise cannot
accomplish on its own. EDC grants long-term tax benefits to ongoing businesses to help them
expand and help to maintain jobs. Most of its support has been towards development of real estate
and information industries due to its focus on supporting the creation of space for office jobs. The
agency does make token, high-profile investments in early-stage accelerators, but those channel
through established universities or are spin-off offices from tech behemoths. On the whole, public
intervention has paid off on a per-project basis and probably helped grow overall size of labor
market, real earnings, and profits. However, because the majority of startups fail, and because the
EDC does not invest resources in helping companies weather failure, the city loses untold amounts
of human and economic capital. The next chapter details how an innovative public-private program
in Barcelona faces the prospect of failure proactively, thereby saving the region jobs and human
capital.
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CHAPTER 5: BARCELONA
Barcelona’s urban economic development policy regime
Barcelona’s urban economic development policy regime involves the municipal
development agency Barcelona Activa, the Consortium for the Commercial Promotion of Catalonia
(COPCA), the Catalan Agency of Competitiveness (ACCIO), and the Barcelona Chamber of
Commerce. Together, these actors develop support programs for entrepreneurs. The focus here is on
the “Reempresa” program housed within Barcelona Activa, which represents an understanding that
facilitating business transfer at the final stages of the business life cycle is part of a healthy financial
ecosystem. Preservation and efficient use of human capital is a recognized part of that program.
The Barcelona City Council created an economic development program called Barcelona
Activa in 1986 (Clark 2010). As a local development agency, its mission is to contribute to the
improvement of quality of life in Barcelona by promoting the economic competitiveness of the city.
The agency approaches this by fostering quality employment and boosting entrepreneurship. They
offer business advice (communication, tax, financings, and training) with a special focus on the
self-employed. According to the agency, its mission is to “make Barcelona an international
benchmark city for work, entrepreneurship and living, with social and environmental values”
(Barcelona Activa 2021).
Barcelona Activa, with the support of the Department of Business and Knowledge of the
Generalitat de Catalunya, sponsored the creation of an associated program, “Reempresa”
(“Restart”) in 2011. Reempresa is essentially a market for buying and selling small and mediumsized companies in the region of Catalonia, where Barcelona is located. It offers a new model of
supporting entrepreneurship and business growth: a professional mechanism by which one or more
“re-entrepreneurs” access the ownership of another’s company, in operation, and grow it without
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having to go through the phase to create it. For most companies, this process means the buyer
assumes the tasks of direction and management started by the founder. According to the Reempresa
program, “all the assets of the company are maintained and it continues to operate, maintaining
jobs, facilities, customers, and suppliers, and giving value to the whole story, especially to the effort
developed in the initial creation and development of the company. In addition, the transfer of
companies strengthens the current and future business fabric and promotes a market that can lead to
economic growth,” (Reempresa 2021). Reempresa services are free to the community, funded in
part by the City Council and also by contributions by a network of dozens of local businesses. The
program offers a range of services to entrepreneurs, but it stands out for its unique approach to
handling company failure, one possible end-stage in a company’s life cycle.
In 2018, Reempresa had in its database 5,227 companies for sale, 10,000 individuals who
have listed themselves as potential buyers or investors, and 1,807 consummated deals. 3 Each
company, with its name redacted, is associated with ten attributes: business activity, company
date of establishment, legal form, number of shareholders, number of employees, last year's
revenue, seller asking price interval, seller asking price, and seller’s gender, education and date of
birth. The 10,000 potential buyers in the database each have seven attributes: buyer sector of
preference, buyer activity of preference, date of birth, education completed, gender, total funding
available, and employment situation. The coming sections demonstrate that the program is well-

3

Beginning in 2017, after discovering the Reempresa program, I contacted the program director (Oriol Alba Sendra)
and his staff analysts. After explaining my project and requesting detailed information about their program, they agreed
to submit my request to their Board of Directors. After a year of negotiation and crafting a Memorandum of
Understanding that certified that my use of the data would be for research purposes only, the Reempresa data analysts
compiled a redacted list of all companies listed for sale, all potential buyers, and detailed demographic elements
associated with each potential or actual transaction. The data is from 2018. The program director promised updates last
year, but the Covid-19 epidemic has disrupted Barcelona and they were not been able to provide those updates. The
existing data are nonetheless sufficiently robust to explore the program.

64

used by many businesses and many types of individuals, with substantial revenue and even more
substantial investment money.

Businesses for sale
Reempresa’s 2018 data show the “average” date of startup to be 1997, but with a wide
distribution of ages: 3,002 (57%) of the 5,227 firms were formed in the year 2000 or after. More
than 4,000 (78%) were formed in 1986 or after.

Firms for sale by startup year of firm
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Figure 32 Barcelona firms for sale by startup year of firm (Reempresa data set)

In the Reempresa database, each enterprise is associated with seller’s “asking price.” The
program reviews and mediates asking prices to ensure reasonability based on standard valuation
elements such as previous years’ sales and organization size. The total combined asking prices of
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all companies is 558,675,329 euros, which at the 2018 average conversion rate of $US 1.25/euro
yields valuations totaling $US 698,344,161.
There is no data for when the companies listed themselves for sale, so there is no telling
how long the company has been “on the market.” Some sellers may have listed their companies as
available from the moment they joined the program and still have not found a buyer. This would
inflate the value of firms for sale because the value is a cumulative number and it is based on asking
price, and therefore is aspirational. The cumulative value grows as more companies add their names
to the list; companies remain on the list until they are sold.
The Barcelona program collected “motivations for sale” from those would-be sellers.
Unsurprisingly, the “retirement” category has the highest selling prices of any category of business.
This indicates that the companies for sale are (a) prized by their owners, (b) are probably “going
concerns,” and (c) may lack the instability related to other categories such as “partner
disagreements” or “inability to conduct business.”
The value of gathering this information stands apart from the uses to which it is put in this
program. The data are volunteered by the participants and offer insights into this phase of the
business cycle that are often personal and always revealing.
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Figure 33 Motivations for sale - count by firm (Reempresa data set)

The average company start date for the firms in each category:
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Figure 34 Motivation for sale by company age (Reempresa data set)

67

The oldest companies on average are the 111 companies listed as “available shop.” They are
predominantly retail stores and presumably are “going concerns” with long histories. Owners might
sell if the price is right; the store is available.
The biggest category, the 1,663 firms in which their owners seek “retirement,” have been in
existence an average of 23 years, suggesting that the owners would like to reap the residual value in
the goodwill of the store rather than simply shut down. A related category “early retirement,”
contains the next oldest set of firms.
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Figure 35 Motivation: retirement (Reempresa data set)
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Those three categories (available, retirement, and early retirement) add up to 1,954 of the
5,227 firms, or 38% of the total. Those firms face the dangers of obsolescence; an aging owner with
no willing family members to assume control of the business is a threat to the well-being of a
business.
For those who wish to sell their company because of “change of career,” the average startup
year is 2004. That category has a similar distribution arc but a start date one generation later. Five
hundred of the seven hundred firms started after the year 2000. This is an interesting category,
because it might signal that the company is fully functional, but the owner has gotten bored or is
disappointed in the outcome compared to his or her expectations.
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Figure 36 Motivation: change of career (Reempresa data set)
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Figure 37 Sectors of companies for sale (Reempresa data set)

For more data on the profiles of the sellers, including education level and gender, see
Appendix. It should not go unmentioned that because the program provides hope for the businesses
that use it, it lessens the reluctance of distressed entrepreneurs to reveal their business details. If
“acceptance” is the first step towards action, this is an indirect way to come to terms with perilous
business conditions.

70

Profile of those looking to purchase a business

The data set about potential buyers of businesses received from Reempresa lists exactly
10,000 people, but that is an artificial cutoff selected by the Barcelona analysts to help me with the
study.
Buyers’ data includes the amount of funding the buyers have available for purchasing
businesses: 716,842,625 euros. That is well more than the total asking price of the businesses for
sale (558,675,329 euros). In other words, the buyers as a group could afford to buy all of the
businesses for sale.
Buyers were about equally employed and unemployed. Highly educated business buyers
were most like to be employed and have more money available for purchasing a business.
Unfortunately, there is no data about the source of the funding available. Perhaps money was
available from existing wealth or from workers’ savings from salary, or possibly from third parties.
The data does not contain the inverse of the “motivation” question asked to the sellers; the buyers
were not asked about their “motivation for buying.” Presumably the unemployed were looking for
an income stream, but they could also be serial entrepreneurs between companies. This would need
additional research. For more information about buyers’ attributes, see Appendix.

71

Program outcomes
Since the Reempresa program began in 2011, it has been involved in the transfer of 1,807
businesses, totalling over 82 million euros in sales.

Sum of Deal
Year

price (euros)

2011

1,088,500.00

2012

2,890,141.00

2013

3,732,525.50

2014

11,079,995.00

2015

16,865,011.27

2016

17,221,068.66

2017

15,751,164.70

2018

14,123,306.76

Grand Total

82,751,712.89

Figure 38 Deals completed by amount by year (Reempresa data set)

82 million euros makes up a small part (about 15%) of the total of all asking prices for all
companies (559 million euros). 1,800 companies comprise about 35% of the 5,227 companies still
for sale. While modest in scale compared to the New York or the Canadian program, these are
significant transfer prices to owners of companies that might otherwise have closed.
The program shows a regular business transfer volume that rose in volume of transactions
and total value of business transfers as the program became established.
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Deal Totals by Quarter (Sale in euros)
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Figure 39 Deal Values by Quarter (Reempresa data set)

Deals by sector
In keeping with the province as a whole, traditional, non-technical sectors dominated the
users of the Reempresa program. If “services, retail and hotel” are counted as services, they
comprise about 75% of the business sector profiles for Catalonia.
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Deal value totals by sector
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Figure 40 Deal Values by sector (Reempresa data set)

Deals counts and average price per deal per sector:
Business Sector

Sum of Deal price

Deals

Avg/deal

Services

€ 22,845,168

494

€ 46,245

Retail

€ 22,230,892

638

€ 34,845

Hotel Industry

€ 19,383,773

557

€ 34,800

Industry

€ 17,169,306

100

€ 171,693

Construction, Refurbishment and Real
Estate

€

734,402

15

€ 48,960

Agriculture and Livestock

€

379,173

2

€ 189,586

Grand Total

€ 82,751,713

Figure 41 Average deal price by sector (Reempresa data set)
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1806

Two trends combine to highlight the potential for a “restart” program for businesses of all
kinds: rising bankruptcy rates and deteriorating employment conditions for low-skilled workers.
Bankruptcies are a growing business, but many firms that cease operations do not declare
bankruptcy because bankruptcy would serve no purpose. If bankruptcies are a bellwether of
business discontinuity, then there are many more company collapses than indicated by bankruptcy
filings. Retirement data correspond to the “silver tsunami” that is expected with baby boomers
hitting retirement age (Geber 2020). Either way there is and will be a demand for end-of-life
business cycles.
Why worry about rescuing small, low-tech companies? David Autor’s analysis of low-skill
and mid-skill occupations in densely populated urban areas demonstrates that saving those low-skill
and mid-skill jobs – and saving the companies that house them – may be more important than ever.
Share of employment in mid-level skills (clerical, admin, sales) has fallen, and falls fastest in dense
urban zones. Autor theorizes that mid-level jobs have been automated and those workers have been
pushed into lower-wage employment. Restarting companies that employ that work force may be the
only way those services and those jobs can survive. See Appendix for Autor’s charts on demand
for job demand as a function of urban density.
Reempresa’s data includes a category for “employees saved,” which are those employees
that in the judgement of the program director would have been “lost” if the company had been
allowed to fail. The table below summarizes employees saved through the Reempresa program by
sector. For a more detailed breakdown by company activity, see Appendix. This finding is
significant, because it shows retaining human capital is a real benefit of these types of transfer-ofsale programs.
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Sum of Employees
saved
Services

622

Hotel Industry

427

Retail

379

Industry

305

Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate

12

Others sectors

5

Agriculture and Livestock

1

(blank)

0

Grand Total

1,751

Figure 42 Employees saved by sector (Reempresa data set)

Unsurprisingly, people who sold their companies for “retirement” reasons got the best
prices. This indicates their businesses were doing well and were suitable to be taken over by the
buyers as a going concern. Firms that were sold for reasons that suggest an unhealthy enterprise,
such as “partner disagreements” or “mismanagement,” did not make nearly as much.

76

'Motivation for sale': Retirement has noticeably higher 'Deal
price'.
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Figure 43 Retirement motivation and deal price (Reempresa data set)

Who gets the money?
Corporations are owned by their shareholders. If a restart program attracts new investors,
the capital infusion stabilizes the company and new management may provide new leadership that
will keep the company solvent. When a business is sold, the proceeds go to the shareholders
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(Business Corporations Law of the State of New York, 2021). 4 Any company that might be in
distress, or that faces discontinuity, can benefit from one of a sale. And, importantly, employees
might benefit as well, making the sale potentially important for retaining human capital by way of
continuity of employment, continuous tax base, or other social stabilities.

Conclusion
Ultimately, Barcelona’s Reempresa program serves as a model for other cities looking to
bolster their entrepreneurial ecosystems. The program addresses the psychological difficulties of
business discontinuity by providing a face-saving outlet for firms on the brink of dissolution.
Through this program, the city of Barcelona can rescue vibrant parts of the economy without
needing to recreate them. Intervention in the form of a restart program can provide a “safe place”
for entrepreneurs to examine their situations with the help of program professionals.

4

There are several ways that can happen, depending on the situation:









One-person business – Money goes to the owner. [Business continues, owner can use money to start anew, or
may continue working as an employee of the company, other employees continue working.]
Multiple owners (common founders, partners, investors, shareholders) split the proceeds according to
ownership percentages or to other formulas prearranged by contract or bylaws. [Same result as above, if all
owners agree on path. If some do not agree, they might possibly sell their interests back to the company and
the company goes forward with new management.]
Debts and payables – Proceeds of sale are subject to settlement of any debts, unpaid payroll, payables owed for
goods and services received, and other legal obligations (taxes, liens, etc.) This may be subject to bankruptcy
law if bankruptcy has been filed, in which case distribution of proceeds is overseen by the court (NYS Bar
Association). Once these obligations are cleared, the above scenarios can take place.
Stock purchase – if a company is acquired with shares of stock in another company rather than cash, owners
receive stock in the acquiring company according to the terms of the sale and internal ownership rules as able.
[Assets of starting company are preserved, employees may continue in new company, investors get new
opportunities with new stock, bankruptcy avoided.]
Asset sales – a company may not put itself up for sale, but offer its assets, such as buildings, assignable
contracts, intellectual property such as patents and trademarks. In that case, the proceeds of the asset sale go
into the company. [Company can use capital from asset sale to stabilize, pay out owners, or start anew. It is
likely that some of the company’s employees might be transferred to the new asset owners, if mutually
agreeable.]
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There is no data from the Barcelona program that follows up on how long the purchased
company remains in business after sale, or how profitable they were, or how many they employed.
These would be excellent additional questions to pursue if additional data is forthcoming from the
Barcelona program. Is the post-sale success rate better in certain sectors than in others?
Registering for help with the Barcelona Reempresa program is tantamount to
acknowledgement of potential failure. Because of the large numbers of users of the program, it also
serves as a “welcome to the club” strategy of acceptance. This can increase motivation among
entrepreneurs, which they must maintain if they are to start a new venture. If the entrepreneur
concludes that because of some internal measure (e.g., age, lack of knowledge in rapidly evolving
market) or because of external attributes (macro-economic conditions) that re-starting is not worth
the effort, salvage value and transfer of viable assets are still positive outcomes.
I’m not proposing copying and inserting the Barcelona program into other cities without
modification, but Reempresa offers one of the only paths—besides outright bankruptcy—for
companies that might cease to operate. By helping to continue businesses that might otherwise
close, they help to quickly recycle expertise into the economy while keep employment structures in
place. New capital and new management may help revitalize moribund enterprises and build using
existing foundations. “Build from ruins, not on them!” (Stark 2019)
If small and privately owned companies with low and mid-level skill employment face the
highest risk of discontinuity, saving those companies and the jobs within them might be the most
important result. Those jobs are not being created by the new economy. Such a re-start program
may save jobs that would otherwise vanish.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The previous chapters examined how economic development public policy regimes in
different urban contexts approach the challenge that every city faces: how to use public-private
partnerships to support entrepreneurship and generate economic development. Chapter 1 framed
this examination with the assumption that any urban economic development public policy regime
that does not take inevitable business failure into account will forfeit untold human and economic
capital when firms fail. In Chapter 2, the analysis assessed the goals of each regime’s agenda—
specifically, which stage of the business life cycle each sought to support—and evaluate whether
each regime achieved those goals.
Three case studies—Canadian cities, New York City, and Barcelona— examine how public
and private partners worked together to support firms at a particular stage in the business life cycle,
and whether they were successful.
Chapter 3 analyzed how the Canadian federal government and private sector investment
firms, through its Venture Capital Action Plan, invested funds in seeding a significant number of
new firms in cities throughout the country, with little planning for subsequent stages of business
development.
Chapter 4 analyzed how New York City formed the Economic Development Corporation as
a public-private entity that aimed to support businesses at all stages but primarily supported larger,
existing firms, demonstrating an avoidance of investing in firms that had higher likelihood of
failure. A small survey of New York City entrepreneurs signaled a desire for such support among
smaller firms.
Finally, Chapter 5 examined the outcomes of Barcelona’s Reempresa program, a joint
initiative of the municipal development agency Barcelona Activa, the Consortium for the
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Commercial Promotion of Catalonia (COPCA), the Catalan Agency of Competitiveness (ACCIO),
and the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce. Reempresa seeks to match up business sellers with
potential buyers, working as the go-between to ensure widespread audiences of potential investors,
and to make deals fair to both parties. The data supplied by Reempresa demonstrate considerable
success in transferring businesses from owners who are no longer able or interested in managing
them to new buyers, saving many jobs in the process. These findings point to the potential for the
Reempresa program—with its mechanism for retaining the human capital that can be lost when
companies fail—to serve as a model for how other cities should approach the universal issue of
company failure.
Ultimately, the goal of this dissertation was to demonstrate why, if cities aim to be
hospitable and productive business environments, their urban economic development policies
should include plans for maximizing the benefits when companies fail. There are substantial
differences among local governments as they seek to bolster employment and facilitate the flow of
commerce in their region. Many of these programs attack well-known problems. Some improve
education and develop skill sets in the worker population because those are correlated with better
jobs and increased income. Some use zoning laws to create new economic sectors or revitalize
aging infrastructure. Some invest in transportation systems, in parks, or in police to create safe and
healthy environments to make the region attractive to workers and businesses, or just to provide a
better life for the citizenry. Many cities form robust public-private partnerships to develop massive
economic development agendas—which are called, for the purpose of this dissertation, urban
economic development public policy regimes—that largely focus on investing in new businesses
through the seed and growth stages. Most of these regimes, however, ignore the inevitability of
failure in entrepreneurship. These strategies are not so much wrong as they are incomplete. The
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seeming denial of failure in these economic development plans is striking considering the fact that
all businesses go through the same life cycle: conception, team formation, capital raising, scaling
up, deploying, and equity outcome or dissolution.
In the United States, bankruptcies are growing (see below). Each bankruptcy can represent
social and financial losses that can last generations. The reaction of entrepreneurs and their staff to a
failed or failing enterprise is based not only on individual proclivities but also on the cultural norms
surrounding the actors. Business discontinuity can be a painful experience to individuals but if it
does eliminate unworthy business models that are unlikely to contribute to economic growth,
society benefits.
It is important to note that not every company that closes goes through a formal bankruptcy
process. They are expensive and are useful for distributing any assets to creditors or shareholders –
if there are any. Companies that run out of money but that don’t have outstanding payables or
tangible assets can simply shut the doors and file for dissolution, or just keep the empty company
going from year to year, paying the filing fees (called “the walking dead” by venture capitalists) and
hoping to one day revitalize themselves. But a measurement of bankruptcy filings can give an idea
of potential demand for end-of-life policies.
In the five boroughs of New York City in the year 2019, there were 7,830 bankruptcy
filings, according to the US Bankruptcy Court reports. Five hundred forty were listed as “business
bankruptcy” and the balance of 7,290 were “non-business” filings that include personal filings.
However, small businesses that are ‘sole proprietorships’ can file for personal bankruptcies under
Chapters 11 and 13, so the distinction between business and non-businesses filings isn’t clear-cut
(Nolo 2022). What is clear is that there are thousands of opportunities for a ‘restart’ program in
New York City.
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Report F-5A.
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, by County
and Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2019
Predominant Nature of Debt
Business
Circuit,
District, and
County
BRONX

County
Code ¹
36005*

Nonbusiness

All
Chapters
1

Chapter
7
1

Chapter
11
0

Chapter
13
0

All
Chapters
11

Chapter
7
5

Chapter
11
0

Chapter
13
6

KINGS

36047

302

144

158

0

2,735

1,965

14

756

NEW YORK

36061*

11

1

10

0

11

10

0

1

QUEENS

36081

204

124

80

0

3,698

2,361

15

1,322

RICHMOND

36085

22

13

9

0

835

591

7

237

7,290

4,932

540

2,322

Source: US States Bankruptcy Court https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-5a/bankruptcy-filings/2019/12/31
Figure 44 New York City Bankruptcy cases: 2019

According to Lee, Yamakawa, Peng, and Barney (2011), “if entrepreneurs are excessively
punished for failure, they may give up potentially high-return but inherently high-risk opportunities
to start a new business.” The authors propose the “start fast, fail fast” model as beneficial to society:
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A fast bankruptcy procedure
A low-cost bankruptcy filing
A fresh start in liquidation
An automatic stay of assets

Entrepreneurship
Development
(New firm entry rate)

Managers stay on the job
Figure 44 Start fast, fail fast

Bankruptcy is a drastic step for entrepreneurs and staff and certainly for investors. A re-sale
program like Barcelona's that acts as a less drastic treatment for a business problem does not
preclude bankruptcy later. And not every troubled enterprise suffers from a fatal flaw in conception.
Some are unlucky with their timing or have inexperienced management that cannot manage
balanced growth. Some, as we saw in Barcelona, attempt to sell a going concern so that they can
retire. The core idea behind the business, or the professionals that they employ, can be revitalized in
a way that is cheaper to put into place than starting from scratch. Not everyone has to start again;
entrepreneurs can pass the baton.

84

Considerations for Implementation: New York City
Life Cycle Perspective
How might a city like New York experiment with bringing the full business life cycle into
policy planning? Incorporating a “whole of business life” approach may require city policy makers
to enlarge their perspective to include that of the entrepreneur. At the outset, this would require
examining data to ascertain what can be learned about where enterprises in New York fall on the
business development arc. It may mean developing new ways to track the activities of developing
and existing companies. The Canadian and Catalonian programs use their programs to gather
important new data elements about companies in their regions. They do this as stockholders in the
Canadian case and as business brokers in Barcelona.
Startup advice
New York City Small Business Administration does offer help and advice to would-be
startups, but that help is primarily geared to creating a checklist of licenses and permits that the city
requires for different types of businesses to legally function in the city. It is helpful (everyone want
to comply with regulations) but it is a bureaucratic view of business designed to alert the
entrepreneur to all the legal obligations with which they must comply. The list is daunting. (See
Appendix B-1 for a sample list of results from the SBA for would-be entrepreneurs who seek
startup advice.)
The City, non-profit organizations, business improvement districts, workforce training
centers, and others offer a plethora of other programs. A coordinating agency that uses the
business-life-cycle approach could re-catalogue existing services based on life cycle and usher
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entrepreneurs through existing (or new) services tailored to the entrepreneur’s place on the business
life cycle arc.

Equity Investments
Public policies may have good intentions but their implementation can be full of difficulties
(see Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). It would take political courage to invest public money in
private startup ventures. First, as shown, most startups fail and even successful ventures can take
years to pay off, so serial investors need to endure almost constant uncertainty. Second, private
equity does not seem to need public incentives to invest in NYC-based companies. Third, the EDC
already offers support through tax incentives and bond underwriting. Fourth, the many competing
demands for uses of tax dollars (health, transportation, housing, etc.) might bring the value of
making equity investments into question.
However, there are rational motives to join with the investor community. First, New York
would not be alone; Canada also used tax incentives to promote businesses but supplemented those
with equity investments, with positive results. Second, the New York startup ecosystem is a good
bet. According to Tech:NYC (https://www.technyc.org/nyc-tech-snapshot):


NYC’S startup ecosystem is valued at $147 billion and is the second most valuable
ecosystem in the work in 2020;



NYC’S tech sector ranked first in Savills Tech Cities Index 5 in 2019.
It is easy to see in hindsight that even a small public ownership interest in the $147 billion

ecosystem would offer potential returns on investment. It would give the city, as a shareholder,

5

Savilles Commercial Property Valuation index
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access to financial data that data would provide a new window into economic, employment and
technological trends taking place in the local environment. By following the Canadian model and
putting investment decisions into the hands of professional venture capitalists, global investment
criteria would be used to guide investments, increasing chances of success and providing a cleanhands approach. Unlike the contrary examples in Pressman and Wildavsky’s aforementioned
Implementation, there need not be pre-determined amounts of ventures per year that would force
investments to be made to meet a quota. Market forces would control the equity outflow. A variety
of investment strategies are available to differentiate New York from other ecosystems.
End-of-business-life strategies. This dissertation posits that cities that provide a full range
of supportive services to entrepreneurs across all stages of the business life cycle, will see greater
benefits to their broader economic development ecosystems—particularly those that pay special
attention to salvaging what is produced by failing companies. Even when the employer is
experiencing a negative return on investment, their employees have multiplier and spillover effects
that can reinforce regional strengths, especially when lost jobs are put back into the working
economy as quickly as possible. By extension, cities that do not support companies transitioning
through failure will not realize as many benefits. What might be the implementation challenges
foreseeable in starting a Barcelona-type “restart” program?
In response to the Covid-19 crisis that has darkened hundreds of storefronts in every
borough of New York City, an effort to support local businesses facing failure could be a showcase
program. “Countless stores and restaurants that were the backbone of their neighborhoods have
been driven out of business by the one-two punch of high rents and the pandemic. But across the
city, small landlords are trying to help small businesses by lowering and -- in some cases -- even
waiving rents, or coming up with other creative arrangements” (Margolies 2021).However,
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implementing policies aimed at addressing failure in New York City would require overcoming
psychological as well as practical barriers. As noted in Chapter 4, EDC espouses a culture of
growth; business transfer and salvage value are not part of its mission. It should reframe the stigma
around failure and see it as an opportunity to support local economic development. The EDC’s
current risk aversion may be related to the City’s perceived need to compete with Silicon Valley.
There is an assumption that acknowledging the possibility of failure will put its mission in jeopardy.
For example, if the agency accepts that a company could fail, it is harder to justify investing
resources to support the company in its earlier stages. The EDC prefers to invest in companies that
seem like “sure things,” though of course in reality, there are no sure things because companies fail
for any number of reasons. This denial mindset makes investing resources in failure particularly
challenging. A shift in mentality would require lots of coaching and convincing. Internal supporters
of such an approach might consider bringing on a strategic consultant that can help the EDC
thereby making it possible to consider investing in companies on the brink of failure.
Another necessary step in implementing a “restart” program in New York City is
establishing trust with the participants. Barcelona’s Reempresa program acts as a neutral
intermediary between buyers and sellers, with all parties reporting personal demographic
information and financial details to the program. The financial data presented by both buyers and
sellers have to at least be nominally verified, but it is not the program’s role to act as an auditor or
guarantor of the company’s profits or the financial resources of the potential buyers. The program
also does not benefit economically from any sales, which promotes trust. This can work as the
model for any other city’s implementation.
One factor that might play a role in bolstering trust in Barcelona’s program is Catalonia’s
history—the fact that Catalonia has been a semi-autonomous territory with its own iconic language
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contributes to a unifying cultural solidarity (Gade 2003). While this shared cultural context does not
apply to New York City, the city could benefit from experimenting with such a program on a
neighborhood level, where affinities are stronger. Starting small can also allow for proof-of-concept
and fine-tuning the program’s offerings, such as providing services in languages common to the
area. Then, building on a reputable brand name with a successful model and duplicating the
program in other localities can help develop trust in solutions tailored to specific contexts.
Ultimately, New York is, to those who dwell there, a patchwork quilt of neighborhoods. Nobody
wants to see empty storefronts in their neighborhood; it lowers property values, depletes the tax
base, and lowers employment. Moreover, neighborhood residents miss the services provided by
those local businesses.
The Evergreen Exchange (formerly the East Williamsburg Industrial Development
Corporation) in northern Brooklyn would be a suitable contender for hosting such a pilot program.
The Evergreen Exchange is a “one-stop resource for industrial businesses in North Brooklyn. No
matter what your firm needs to grow and stay competitive, we are your link to the resources your
company needs to achieve its goals” (Evergreenexchange.org). The association has provided
neighborhood firms with business advice for forty years, and in some cases has served
multigenerational constituents, building goodwill in the area. Executive Director Leah Archibald
explained that Evergreen most often serves manufacturing companies that offer working-class jobs
that provide entry into the workforce for non-college trained people or non-English-speaking
immigrants who nonetheless have many of the requisite skills (Personal interview, 3-11-22).
Ms. Archibald explained that, in Evergreen’s experience, the EDC has lately become more
concerned with threats to business continuity but has a standard, one-size-fits-all approach to
succession planning: employee buyouts and subsequent employee ownership to keep local
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businesses running. While this suggests that business continuity is a known and growing concern in
New York City, leveraged buyouts are complex and should not be the standard (and only) answer to
the problem. It may be appropriate in some instances, but a wider range of end-of-life solutions is
available.
Archibald suggests that the optimal deployment of a Reempresa-like program might be a
hub-and-spoke model, with a centralized knowledge database and satellite offices that serve
different neighborhoods. Further discussion with the Barcelona program managers might help
understand their successful implementation methods. But ultimately, such an approach would be
well worth the risks EDC would need to take to innovate in this manner.
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Appendix A: Canadian cities

Type of Investors Participating in VCAP
Source

Total Commitments (C$M) as
of January 1, 2018

% of Total

Gov't of Canada

339.5

25.00%

Provinces

112.5

8.00%

Pension Funds

187.5

14.00%

Financial Institutions and
Insurance Companies

207.5

15.00%

Endowment

15

1.00%

Retail Funds

125.6

9.00%

Corporate Strategic

102.5

8.00%

Asset Management Firm

53.1

4.00%

High Net Worth Individuals

202.1

15.00%

General Partners

10.7

0.80%

1,356.00

100.00%

Grand Total
Figure 45 Type of investor in VCAP program
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Sector Distribution of Investments Countrywide

Internet & Comm Tech,
$1,144,125,782

Life Sciences,
$322,222,558
Environmt & Clean
Tech, $168,604,901
ENVIRONMT & CLEAN TECH

LIFE SCIENCES

Figure 46 Canadian VC countrywide by sector
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INTERNET & COMM TECH

Environment & Clean Tech - Countrywide
$40,000,000

$35,000,000

$30,000,000

$25,000,000

17 companies
$169 million total

$20,000,000

$15,000,000

$10,000,000

$5,000,000

$0

Figure 47 Environment and Clean Tech – Canada wide
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Internet & Computer Tech - Countrywide
$100,000,000

$90,000,000

$80,000,000

225 Companies
$1.144 billion total

$70,000,000

$60,000,000

$50,000,000

$40,000,000

$30,000,000

$20,000,000

$10,000,000

$-

Figure 48 VCAP Internet / Computer investment
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Environment & Clean Tech - Countrywide
$40,000,000

$35,000,000

$30,000,000

$25,000,000

$20,000,000

17 companies
$169 million total
Each bar represents
a single investment.

$15,000,000

$10,000,000

$5,000,000

$0

Figure 49 Canadian Clean Tech Investments
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Figure 50 VCAP Biotech investment
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Early Stage

Seed

Seed

Seed

Early Stage

Early Stage

Seed

Late Venture

Early Stage

Early Stage

Early Stage

Growth Equity

Late Venture

Growth Equity

Growth Equity

Late Venture

Early Stage

Growth Equity

Growth Equity

$30,000,000

Seed

Growth Equity

Late Venture

Growth Equity

Life Sciences - Countrywide

$35,000,000

$322 million
46 companies

$25,000,000

$20,000,000

$15,000,000

$10,000,000

$5,000,000

$0

Figure 51 City/province investment comparison

Invested outside
city

Invested in
major city

Total

Ontario

149,377,232

620,859,498

Toronto

81%

770,236,730

Quebec

39,861,519

461,257,168

Montreal

92%

501,118,687

Alberta

23,403,421

171,084,946

Calgary

88%

194,488,367

Brit Col

8,255,672

109,531,676

Vancouver

93%

117,787,348

Nova Sc

17,222,940

17,917,926

Halifax

51%

35,140,866

Saskat

-

20,158,336

Saskatoon

100%

20,158,336

Manitoba

-

13,335,458

Winnipeg

100%

13,335,458
$1,652,265,793

Invested in major
cities:

$1,362,733,288

(82% of total)

BDC Data
Set
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Province

Population

Ontario

14,446,515

38.7%

Quebec

8,433,301

22.6%

British Columbia

5,020,302

13.5%

Alberta

4,345,737

11.6%

Manitoba

1,360,396

3.6%

Saskatchewan

1,168,423

3.1%

Nova Scotia

965,382

2.6%

New Brunswick

772,094

2.1%

Newfoundland

523,790

1.4%

Prince Edward Island

154,748

0.4%

Northwest Territory

44,598

0.1%

Yukon

40,369

0.1%

Nunavut

38,787

0.1%

37,314,442

100%

Figure 52 Canadian population distribution

Source: Statistics Canada
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Figure 53 Canadian population movement

Province

$ Investments

% of population

% of
investment

Dollars per person
per province

Ontario

770,236,730

39%

47%

$53.32

Quebec

501,118,687

23%

30%

$59.42

Alberta

194,488,367

12%

12%

$44.75

Brit Col

117,787,348

13%

7%

$23.46

Nova Sc

35,140,866

3%

2%

$36.40

Saskat

20,158,336

3%

1%

$17.25

Manitoba

13,335,458

4%

1%

$ 9.80

1,652,265,793

100%

Figure 54 Distribution of Investments by Province (Business Development Bank of Canada)
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Figure 55 Canadian Population growth / earnings per area
% of city
population

City

Dollars per person
per metro

Pop growth
2011-16

Toronto

5,928,040

39%

129.93

6.18%

Montreal

4,098,927

27%

122.26

4.19%

Vancouver

2,463,431

16%

78.95

6.49%

Calgary

1,392,609

9%

84.58

14.63%

Winnipeg

778,489

5%

45.14

6.64%

Halifax

403,390

3%

49.97

3.35%

Saskatoon

295,095

2%

45.19

12.54%

15,359,981

100%
Avg growth
all Canada:

Source: 2018 BDC Financial Report

Figure 56 Canadian GDP by sector (Business Development Bank of Canada)

GDP Contribution - countrywide
$100,000,000,000
$90,000,000,000
$80,000,000,000
$70,000,000,000
$60,000,000,000
$50,000,000,000
$40,000,000,000
$30,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000
$ITC

ECT
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Life Sciences

5%

Appendix B: New York City

Figure 57 NYC Seed through Late Stage Funding
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Figure 58 Startup funding distribution NYC
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Figure 59 Seed Through Late-Stage VC Funding in NYC
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Top Raisers 2019 (Crunchbase):
Sidewalk Infrastructure Partners

$

400,000,000

Finance

Ramp

$

205,000,000

Finance, Financial Services, FinTech

MindMed

$

175,302,275

GreenAcreage Real Estate Corp

$

141,000,000

Biotechnology, Health Care, Medical,
Pharmaceutical
Property Management, Real Estate

Elevation Oncology

$

97,500,000

Vindex

$

80,000,000

Tend

$

73,000,000

HiberCell

$

60,750,000

Biopharma, Biotechnology, Health Care, Life
Science, Pharmaceutical
Digital Entertainment, eSports, Infrastructure, Video
Games
Dental, Health Care, Medical, Personal Health,
Wellness
Biotechnology

Cambrian Biopharma

$

60,000,000

Biopharma, Biotechnology, Life Science

Chronosphere

$

54,400,000

Valon Technologies

$

53,200,000

Analytics, Cloud Infrastructure, Information
Technology, Productivity Tools, SaaS
FinTech, Real Estate

$

1,400,152,275

Figure 60 NYC top VC deals 2019 (Crunchbase data set)
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New Lab survey: additional questions

If you have already started a company, do you personally own all, part, or none of this business? w
All

2

Part

13

None

1

How much money, in total, did you raise or do you expect to raise in Seed financing and Series A financing?
Please include loans and equity/ownership investments.

Money Raised ($ Millions)

$0

$2

$4

$6
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$8

$10

$12

PORTION OF INVESTMENT FROM
PERSONAL FUNDS

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

107

50%

60%

70%

80%

Appendix B-1: New York City Startup Wizard Sample Results

Small Business Advocates help you cut through the red tape by working together with our colleagues at City
and State regulatory agencies, and utilities including:
•

Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY)

•

NYC Department of Buildings (DOB)

•

NYC Department of Consumer & Worker Protection (DCWP)

•

NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)

•

NYC Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH)

•

NYC Department of Sanitation (DSNY)

•

NYS Department of Agriculture & Markets

•

NYS Department of Financial Services

•

NYS Liquor Authority

•

Con Edison

NYC AUTOMATED STARTUP ADVICE – Sample from https://www1.nyc.gov/nycbusiness/wizard/result

Your Results
Below is your custom list of requirements.

Create Your Business
Employer Identification Number (EIN) Internal Revenue Service FEDERAL
Businesses need an Employer Identification Number (EIN) for many common purposes. EINs are issued by...
MORE INFO

Prepare to Open
Certificate of Occupancy Buildings, Department of CITY
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A new or amended Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) is required if construction will create a new building...
MORE INFOConstruction Permits Buildings, Department of CITY
The Department of Buildings reviews construction plans to ensure that they comply with the Building
Code... MORE INFO
Portable Fire Extinguisher Requirements Fire Department CITY
Portable fire extinguishers are an important part of an overall fire safety program. FDNY regulations...
MORE INFO
Food Protection Certificate Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of CITY
"New Virtual Classroom Course."... MORE INFO
Food Service Establishment Permit Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of CITY
A Food Service Establishment is a place where food is provided for individual portion service directly...
MORE INFO
Performing Work on a Landmarked Property Landmark Preservation Commission CITY
Owners of a New York City landmark or a building located within a designated New York City historic
district... MORE INFO
NYC Parks Request for Proposal (RFP) Parks and Recreation, Department of CITY
Requests for Proposals (RFPs) are issued for a variety of Parks concessions, including but not limited...
MORE INFO
Street Tree Planting Permit Parks and Recreation, Department of CITY
To plant a tree on New York City property, a business must obtain a Tree Planting Permit and hire a
landscape... MORE INFO
Tree Work Permit Parks and Recreation, Department of CITY
No work may be performed on or within 50 feet of a street tree without a Tree Work Permit from Parks...
MORE INFO
Recycling and Waste Removal Sanitation, Department of CITY
All businesses in New York City are required to recycle and dispose of all types of waste through a
licensed... MORE INFO
Sales Tax Vendor Registration (Certificate of Authority) Taxation and Finance, Department of STATE
Businesses that sell tangible personal property or taxable services in New York State need a Certificate...
MORE INFO
Employee Disability Coverage Workers' Compensation Board STATE
New York State requires employers to provide disability benefits coverage to employees. These are for...
MORE INFO
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Open and Operate
Temporary Place of Assembly Certificate of Operation Buildings, Department of CITY
Most events with limited durations need a Temporary Place of Assembly (TPA) Certificate of Operation...
MORE INFO
Information About Hiring a Private Carter Business Integrity Commission CITY
Every commercial establishment in New York City that will not haul its own waste is required by law to...
MORE INFO
Newsstand License Consumer Affairs, Department of CITY
A Newsstand License is required for a business that will operate a stand or booth on a public sidewalk...
MORE INFO
Tobacco Retail Dealer License Consumer Affairs, Department of CITY
You must have a Tobacco Retail Dealer license to sell cigarettes or tobacco products directly to
consumers.... MORE INFO
OFTB Optional Permit Film, Theatre & Broadcasting, Office of CITY
A permit from the Office of Film, Theatre and Broadcasting (OFTB) is not required for any of the following...
MORE INFO
Commercial Rent Tax Finance, Department of CITY
This tax is charged to tenants who occupy or use a property for commercial activity in Manhattan, south...
MORE INFO
Certificate of Fitness to Operate and Maintain Air Compressors (A-35) Fire Department CITY
A permit is required for any air compressor that compresses non-flammable gas (including air) at
pressures... MORE INFO
Information About Pest Control Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of CITY
It is important for all businesses in New York City to prevent pest infestations in and around where... MORE
INFO
Manufacturing of Frozen Desserts - Retail Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of CITY
Any place or premises, or any part thereof, where frozen desserts are manufactured, processed,
assembled,... MORE INFO
Canopy Permit Transportation, Department of CITY
A permit from the Department of Transportation (DOT) is required for the installation or maintenance...
MORE INFOCity
Racks Program Transportation, Department of CITY
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The CityRacks program provides free bike racks for neighborhoods or businesses.... MORE INFO
Newsrack Registration Form Transportation, Department of CITY
The Department of Transportation (DOT) regulates any newsracks placed on City sidewalks. A newsrack is...
MORE INFO
Revocable Consent Petition Transportation, Department of CITY
If you intend to install a structure on, under or over a City street or sidewalk, you must petition (apply)...
MORE INFO
Lottery Agent License Lottery, Division of STATE
This license allows a retailer to sell New York State Lottery tickets.... MORE INFO
Cigarette and Tobacco Product Sales as a Retail Dealer Registration Taxation and Finance, Department of
STATE
Businesses selling cigarettes must register with the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance...
MORE INFO
Workers' Compensation Insurance Workers' Compensation Board STATE
Businesses in New York State must have workers' compensation coverage for all employees. ... MORE INFO

Identify Incentives
Industrial and Commercial Abatement Program (ICAP) Finance, Department of CITY
This program provides abatements for property taxes for periods of up to 25 years. Industrial and
commercial... MORE INFO
Energy Cost Savings Program Small Business Services, Department of CITY
The Energy Cost Savings Program (ECSP) can reduce regulated energy costs up to 45 percent and
regulated... MORE INFO
Lower Manhattan Energy Program Small Business Services, Department of CITY
The Lower Manhattan Energy Program (LMEP) provides property owners and commercial tenants in
eligible... MORE INFO

Learn About Taxes
New York City Payroll Tax Taxation and Finance, Department of STATE
People, trusts, and estates must pay the New York City Personal Income Tax if they earn income in the...
MORE INFOReal Property Capital Improvements and Repairs Taxation and Finance, Department of STATE
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Sales tax on contracting work done on real property is not always collected. If the work done is a capital...
MORE INFO

Comply with Regulations
Asbestos Rules and Regulations Environmental Protection, Department of CITY
The removal and/or abatement of asbestos containing materials (ACM) from structures must occur in
strict... MORE INFO
Smoke Free Air Act - Information Health and Mental Hygiene, Department of CITY
The Smoke Free Air Act (SFAA) of 2002 protects the health of New York City workers against the harmful...
MORE INFO
Accepting Electronic Signatures Administrative and Support Services STATE
Electronic signatures are equal to paper signatures in New York State. The Electronics Signatures and...
MORE INFO
Sexual Harassment Training for All Employees Law, Department of STATE
As of October 9, 2018, employers must provide their workers training on sexual harassment prevention....
MORE INFO
Paid Family Leave Workers' Compensation Board STATE
As of January 1, 2018, paid family leave is mandatory in New York State. Almost all employees are eligible...
MORE INFO

Access Useful Information
Buildings Information System Buildings, Department of CITY
The Buildings Information System (BISWeb) is the Department of Buildings' (DOB) main database and
provides... MORE INFO
Information About Construction and Renovation Buildings, Department of CITY
Licensed professionals such as architects, engineers, and contractors generally must apply for
construction... MORE INFO
Zoning Information City Planning, Department of CITY
Zoning regulations govern the use of space and land in New York City and impact businesses in several...
MORE INFO
Information About Sprinklers, Fire Alarms, and Standpipes Fire Department CITY
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The Department of Buildings requires buildings to install fire alarms, fire suppression systems,... MORE
INFO
Business Owner Bill of Rights Small Business Services, Department of CITY
As part of New York City's commitment to provide New Yorkers with excellent customer service, the
Mayor's... MORE INFO
Incentives Estimator Small Business Services, Department of CITY
The NYC Business Incentives Estimator helps businesses find and learn about city, state, and federal...
MORE INFO
Figure 61 NYC SBA startup guide sample
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Appendix C: Barcelona

Reempresa survey: companies for sale by company start date

Year
established

Frequency

Year
established

Year
established

Frequency

Frequency

1900

6

1943

4

1986

59

1901

0

1944

1

1987

67

1902

2

1945

2

1988

81

1903

0

1946

1

1989

68

1904

1

1947

5

1990

100

1905

0

1948

6

1991

59

1906

0

1949

5

1992

92

1907

0

1950

14

1993

63

1908

0

1951

4

1994

81

1909

0

1952

6

1995

79

1910

2

1953

6

1996

94

1911

0

1954

7

1997

83

1912

1

1955

8

1998

91

1913

3

1956

6

1999

68

1914

1

1957

8

2000

118

1915

2

1958

4

2001

90

1916

2

1959

7

2002

90

1917

1

1960

33

2003

86

1918

0

1961

9

2004

119

1919

0

1962

12

2005

129

1920

2

1963

12

2006

159

1921

0

1964

12

2007

164

1922

0

1965

20

2008

168

1923

1

1966

24

2009

139

1924

1

1967

11

2010

230

1925

2

1968

16

2011

268

1926

1

1969

18

2012

314

1927

2

1970

40

2013

274

1928

16

1971

23

2014

276

1929

3

1972

26

2015

195

1930

25

1973

23

2016

118

114

1931

0

1974

36

2017

72

1932

15

1975

36

2018

5

1933

4

1976

36

1934

2

1977

42

1935

1

1978

48

1936

2

1979

45

1937

0

1980

78

1938

0

1981

40

1939

3

1982

69

1940

6

1983

57

Total for

sale:

1941

6

1984

61

5,227

firms

1942

3

1985

91

Column
Total

116

1012

4099

Figure 62 Firms for sale by start date table (Reempressa data set)

115

Occupational employment shares among working-age adults by commuting zone population density, 1970-2015

Figure 63 Employment by population density

Source: Autor, in The Centre for Economic Policy Research (www.cepr.org)
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Motivation
Retirement
Personal reasons
Change of career
Health
Inability to conduct business
Change of residence
Lack of time

# firms
1663
695
685
436
421
398
381

Motivation
Other
Tiredness
Early retirement
Available shop
Investor search
None listed
Disagreements

# firms
230
204
180
111
77
48
43

Figure 64 Motivations for sale / count by firm (Reempressa data set)

From the sorted list of motivations for selling the businesses, the average
company start date is calculated for the firms in each category.

Motivation
Retirement
Personal reasons
Change of career
Health
Inability to conduct business
Change of residence
Lack of time

Avg
start
year
1985
2004
2004
2001
2005
2007
2007

Motivation
Other
Tiredness
Early retirement
Available shop
Investor search
None listed
Disagreements

Figure 65 Motivation for sale by company age (Reempressa data set)
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Avg start
year
2003
2002
1993
1963
2006
2003
2009

Detailed data on sellers’ asking prices by sector and by education

Sum of Seller asking
prices – Euros
Primary or lower
secondary education
Higher secondary
education
Post-secondary nontertiary education

Agriculture
and
Livestock

Construction,
Refurbishment
and Real
Estate

5,140,000

13,454,000

2,980,000

Industry

Others
sectors

Retail

Services

80,527,110

52,079,399

200,000

58,599,369

78,273,682

6,635,000

33,998,404

37,602,999

409,000

34,018,100

31,602,897

1,709,750

9,692,100

10,906,100

8,781,400

16,259,300

756,000

11,144,497

9,660,000

5,099,895

8,918,000

868,000

2,951,000

9,708,000

5,284,352

7,540,512

5,489,000

1,950,000

2,903,000

2,004,462

9,650,001

23,422,750

143,802,111

121,906,498

609,000

114,686,117

144,598,853

2%

4%

26%

22%

0%

21%

26%

Category left blank
Engineering
Business school
Grand Total

Sum of Seller asking
prices - Euros
Primary or lower
secondary education
Higher secondary
education
Post-secondary nontertiary education

1,530,000
1

Grand Total
288,273,560

52%

147,246,400

26%

47,348,650

8%

Category left blank

35,578,392

6%

Engineering

27,881,864

5%

Business school

12,346,463

2%

558,675,329

100%

Grand Total

Hotel
Industry

Figure 66 Asking price by education of buyers (Reempressa data set)
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EDUCATION LEVEL OF SELLERS

Primary or lower secondary
education

5% 2%
6%

Higher secondary education

9%
Post-secondary non-tertiary
education
52%

Category left blank
Engineering

26%

Business school

Figure 67 Education level of sellers (Reempressa data set)
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Business Sector - Sellers

Man

Woman

Retail

954

1,166

Services

850

724

Hotel Industry

723

565

Industry

363

77

Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate

120

25

25

4

3

2

3,038

2,563

Agriculture and Livestock
Other sectors

Total
Figure 68 Sellers by gender and sector (Reempressa data set)

6%

3%
Higher Education

6%
32%

Higher secondary education
Primary or lower secondary
education

10%

Post-secondary non-tertiary
education
Engineering
(blank)

17%

Business school
26%

Figure 69 Education level of buyers (Reempressa data set)
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'Education completed': Higher Education and Engineering
have noticeably higher 'Total funding'.
Higher Education

Education completed

Engineering
Business school
Higher secondary education
Primary or lower secondary education
Post-secondary non-tertiary education
(blank)
0.00

100.00

200.00

300.00

Millions
Total funding

Figure 70 Higher education = higher price (Reempressa data set)
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Count of Employment
situation

Row Labels

Employed
Unemployed
(blank)
Grand Total

Higher
Education

Higher
secondary
education

Postsecondary
non-tertiary
education

Primary or
lower
secondary
education

Business
school

Engineering

Grand
Total

170
101

428
218

1809
1391

1019
1590

422
573

742
944

210
157

271

646

3200

2609

995

1686

367

(blank)

4800
4974
226
10000

In graphic form:

Buyers' employment situation by education level
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Business
school

Engineering

Higher
Education

Employed

Higher
secondary
education

Post-secondary
non-tertiary
education

Unemployed

Figure 71 Buyers' employment status (Reempressa data set)
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Primary or
lower
secondary
education

(blank)

Gender and sector intersections
Count of Buyer sector of preference
Row Labels
Services
Retail
Hotel Industry
Industry
Not specified
Construction, Refurbishment and Real
Estate
Other sectors
Agriculture
Grand Total
Figure 72 Gender and sector intersections (Reempressa data set)

Source: www.theglobalaleconomy.com/spain
Figure 73 Male participation in Spanish workforce
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Man Woman (blank)
1953
1158
3
1385
1342
6
1257
929
9
988
141
2
175
82
4

Grand
Total
3114
2733
2195
1131
261

199
172
75
6204

242
224
100
10000

43
51
24
3770

1
1
26

Gender and education: The extra portion of women who were selling their companies seems to be
concentrated in the retail sector, which is the only category that had a greater proportion of
women than men.

Count of Education completed buyers

Higher Education
Higher secondary education
Primary or lower secondary
education
Post-secondary non-tertiary
education
Engineering
Business school

%
Man Woman Woman
1928
1278
40%
1551
1061
41%

Grand
Total
3206
2612

996

692

41%

1688

576
574
221

420
73
51

42%
11%
19%

996
647
272

Figure 74 Barcelona Gender and education (Reempressa data set)
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Buyers’ target sectors by education level

Lower education levels tend to prefer hotel, retail and construction. Higher education
tended towards service or specifically qualified areas (engineering graduates to engineering
schools).

Sectors
Higher Education
Agriculture
Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate
Hotel Industry
Industry
Not specified
Other sectors
Retail
Services

Count of Education
completed
3206
35
72
559
404
27
73
826
1210

Higher secondary education
Agriculture
Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate
Hotel Industry
Industry
Not specified
Other sectors
Retail
Services

2612
30
51
605
194
143
65
771
753

Primary or lower secondary education
Agriculture
Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate
Hotel Industry
Industry
Not specified
Other sectors
Retail
Services

1688
15
43
596
86
11
19
569
349
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Post-secondary non-tertiary education
Agriculture
Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate
Hotel Industry
Industry
Not specified
Other sectors
Retail
Services

996
4
26
232
77
12
12
308
325

Engineering
Agriculture
Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate
Hotel Industry
Industry
Not specified
Other sectors
Retail
Services

647
11
32
41
249
1
19
100
194

Business school
Agriculture
Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate
Hotel Industry
Industry
Other sectors
Retail
Services

272
2
5
35
61
11
46
112

Figure 75 Barcelona Buyers' target sector by buyer education (Reempressa data set)
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Deals counts and average price per deal per sector:
Business Sector

Sum of Deal price

Deals

Avg/deal

Services

€

22,845,168

494

€

46,245

Retail

€

22,230,892

638

€

34,845

Hotel Industry

€

19,383,773

557

€

34,800

Industry

€

17,169,306

100

€ 171,693

Construction, Refurbishment and Real Estate

€

734,402

15

Agriculture and Livestock

€

379,173

2

Grand Total

€

82,751,713

1806

Figure 76 Average price per deal by sector (Reempressa data set)
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€

48,960

€ 189,586

Barcelona Deal data by detailed business types

Business Activity

Count of
Businesses

Bar and Coffee shop
Grocery store / Supermarket
Restaurant, Takeaway
Clothes, shoes and accessories
Hairdressing and beauty salon
Others
Pastry and bakery
Mechanical workshop
Bookstore, stationery, kiosk and office supplies
Academy, School and Driving School
Electronics, Photography, Computer science
Dry cleaning, keys and shoe repair
Herbalist' and dietetics
Distribution
e-Commerce
Fruit and Vegetables
Metallurgy
Clinic and Health Center
Graphic arts, advertising, marketing and
communication
Haberdashery
Miscellaneous products
Disco, Music bar
Grocery store
Consulting, advisory and management services
Furniture, decoration and household items
Florist's shop, garden and animals
Gymnasiums and wellness
Hardware, DIY and handicrafts
Cleaning service
Miscellaneous services
Taxi license
Machinery and equipment
Nursery school, playground
Perfumery and cosmetics
Tobacco shop, Lottery and Stamps
Catering
Sports store
Transporting
Computer Science
Copy shop and printing
Hotel, Hostel and Guesthouse
Miscellaneous manufacturers
Bazaar, Gift items
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Sum of
Employees
Saved

Total
Employees
After Deal

259
188
183
104
93
73
70
69
64
36
32
30
29
23
23
23
23
22

126
140
203
47
49
54
52
72
32
71
15
22
10
34
5
19
108
34

572
435
637
183
172
159
176
187
115
135
56
70
48
66
39
55
152
75

22
19
18
17
17
15
15
14
14
14
13
13
13
11
11
11
11
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
8

26
5
14
9
24
40
5
10
14
21
42
30
1
44
7
5
2
13
6
10
58
6
16
34
3

73
25
39
46
55
66
37
29
35
45
63
47
16
63
30
18
18
30
19
28
86
20
35
100
11

Massages and Therapy
Textile Company
Woodworking
Workshop and installations
Chemistry
Jewelry, Bijoux and accessories
Recreation Park, Attractions Park
Refurbishment
Second hand items
Canine hairdressing salon
Pharmacy and parafarmacy
Plastic industry
Veterinary Consultants
Automobile industry
Event organization, modeling agency and
stewardesses
Insurances
Residence hall
Telecomunicacions i telefonia
Automobile and nautical
Country tourism
Courier services
Energy company
Import and export
Travel Agency
Call center
Car washing
Design and development
Gardening
Gas station and service area
Optics and Auditing Center
Real estate
Cocktel bar
Farming
Furniture
Internet and web portals
Mineria
Pharmacy and cosmetics
Rent a car
Security company
Various
Grand Total
Business Activity

8
8
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
4

11
33
13
1
9
2
9
10
4
2
5
14
3
12

26
53
22
9
17
9
16
17
14
8
14
21
13
26

4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

10
1
19
9
9
1
7
6
3
1
0
1
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
2
0
3
5

24
7
26
20
16
6
12
9
8
6
4
4
2
4
6
3
3
3
2
6
1
2
3
1
5
6

1,807

1,751
Sum of
Employees
Saved

4,820
Total
Employees
After Deal

Count of
Businesses

Figure 77 Reempressa Deals / Employees Saved by detailed business activity (Reempressa data set)
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'Seller education': Higher secondary education and Higher
Education have noticeably higher 'Deal price'.
Seller education

Higher secondary education
Higher Education
(blank)
Primary or lower secondary education
Post-secondary non-tertiary education
Engineering
Business school
0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

Millions
Deal price

Figure 78 Seller education and deal price (Reempressa data set)

Deals done by sector by gender
Business Sector
Retail
Hotel Industry
Services
Industry
Construction, Refurbishment and Real
Estate
Agriculture and Livestock
Others sectors
Grand Total

Man
259
296
240
70

Woman
287
184
191
14

(blank)
92
77
63
16

7
2

3

5

1
680

253

874

Figure 79 Deals by sector and gender (Reempressa data set)
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Grand
Total
638
557
494
100
15
2
1
1807
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